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This	  thesis	  looks	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  secession	  in	  international	  relations.	  	  An	  opening	  
section	  defines	  secession,	  exposes	  hypocrisy	  on	  this	  issue,	  and	  makes	  a	  case	  for	  the	  
significance	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  Next,	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  search	  for	  answers	  to	  three	  closely	  related	  
questions	  on	  the	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  First	  I	  ask,	  what	  is	  the	  status	  of	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  in	  international	  law?	  	  I	  frame	  my	  search	  around	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐
determination	  and	  find	  that,	  while	  a	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  does	  still	  exist	  in	  
international	  law,	  it	  no	  longer	  contains	  a	  sub-­‐right	  to	  secession	  or	  independence.	  	  
Next	  I	  look	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  normative	  international	  relations	  theory:	  what	  
normative	  theories	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  have	  normative	  international	  relations	  
theorists	  developed.	  	  I	  find	  four	  distinct	  categories,	  provide	  examples,	  and	  arrange	  
them	  on	  an	  ideological	  continuum.	  	  In	  my	  concluding	  chapter,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  various	  
issues	  and	  concerns	  that	  one	  would	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  to	  develop	  a	  feasible	  
and	  complete	  right	  to	  secession,	  with	  attention	  to	  what	  is	  politically	  possible	  at	  the	  
international	  level.	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Chapter	  1	  –	  A	  Right	  to	  Sovereignty	  
	   For	  all	  the	  disagreements	  among	  nations,	  it	  seems	  that	  all	  nations	  can	  agree	  
on	  two	  key	  things.	  	  First,	  all	  just	  states	  have	  a	  right	  to	  sovereignty,	  which	  loosely	  
means	  that	  all	  nations	  have	  an	  equal	  right	  to	  do	  as	  they	  see	  fit	  within	  their	  territory	  
and	  other	  nations	  must	  respect	  each	  other’s	  territorial	  integrity.	  	  And	  second,	  that	  
the	  international	  community’s	  primary	  goal	  should	  be	  the	  promotion	  of	  peace	  and	  
security	  among	  nations.	  	  Both	  are	  enshrined	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  
international	  law	  and	  are	  often	  cited	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  international	  community.1	  
But	  what	  happens	  when	  these	  two	  goals	  contradict	  each	  other,	  as	  they	  do	  
when	  a	  non-­‐state	  group	  unilaterally	  declares	  independence	  and	  is	  suppressed	  by	  
the	  host	  state?	  	  The	  short	  answer	  is,	  people	  die	  –	  at	  least	  until	  the	  international	  
community	  can	  decide	  which	  goal	  is	  more	  important	  in	  that	  particular	  case.	  	  The	  
death	  toll	  range	  of	  these	  independence	  movements	  is	  huge:	  3,000	  in	  Morocco,	  
32,000	  in	  Cameroon,	  310,000	  in	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  Yugoslavia	  as	  nation	  after	  nation	  
declared	  independence,	  all	  the	  way	  up	  to	  1,000,000	  in	  Algeria.2	  	  	  
In	  the	  modern	  international	  system,	  a	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	  
nearly	  always	  means	  conflict	  and	  usually	  war.	  	  But,	  does	  it	  have	  to?	  	  In	  the	  chapters	  
to	  follow,	  I	  search	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  of	  these	  non-­‐state	  groups.	  	  I	  ask	  –	  	  and	  seek	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  By	  “international	  community”	  I	  mean	  the	  community	  of	  states,	  international	  
organizations,	  and	  other	  non-­‐state	  organizations	  who	  participate	  in	  politics	  at	  the	  
international	  level.	  
2	  Milton	  Leitenberg,	  “Deaths	  in	  Wars	  and	  Conflicts	  in	  the	  20th	  Century”	  
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/deathswarsconflictsjune52006.pdf	  
(last	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2013).	  	  I	  picked	  Leitenberg’s	  numbers	  because	  his	  
methodology	  struck	  me	  as	  conservative,	  yet	  more	  holistic	  than	  the	  “battle-­‐related	  
death”	  limitations	  other	  datasets	  use.	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answers	  for	  –	  three	  closely	  related	  questions.	  	  (1)	  What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  in	  international	  law?	  	  (2)	  What	  theories	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  have	  
normative	  international	  relations	  (IR)	  theorists	  developed?	  (3)	  What	  should	  a	  path	  
forward	  look	  like?	  
I	  begin,	  however,	  with	  this	  introductory	  chapter.	  	  I	  will	  define	  some	  of	  my	  key	  
terms	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  set	  up	  the	  scope	  and	  parameters	  of	  this	  project.	  	  Next,	  I	  trace	  
the	  genesis	  of	  modern	  secession,	  noting	  important	  hypocrisy	  early	  in	  modern	  
secession’s	  history.	  	  Then,	  I	  make	  the	  case	  that	  this	  is	  an	  international	  issue,	  
preempting	  the	  possible	  critique	  that	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  best	  solved	  individually	  by	  the	  
states.	  	  I	  conclude	  this	  chapter	  by	  previewing	  the	  coming	  chapters	  and	  by	  
delineating	  what	  I	  think	  are	  this	  work’s	  contributions.	  	  
Definitions	  
	   Before	  I	  go	  any	  further,	  I	  need	  to	  define	  a	  couple	  terms	  that	  will	  have	  
significant	  influence	  over	  what	  this	  work	  is,	  and	  is	  not.	  	  By	  secession,	  I	  mean	  
complete	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  separation	  of	  two	  or	  more	  groups	  of	  
people,	  where	  the	  non-­‐state	  group	  forms	  a	  new,	  independent,	  and	  sovereign	  state.	  	  I	  
do	  not	  mean	  autonomy	  within	  a	  state,	  where	  certain	  state	  functions	  are	  still	  
performed	  by	  the	  host	  state.	  	  Likewise,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  revolution,	  though	  the	  two	  are	  
often	  equated	  and	  both	  are	  forms	  of	  intrastate	  conflict.	  	  Unlike	  secession,	  revolution	  
is	  a	  challenge	  of	  a	  government’s	  claim	  to	  authority.	  	  Secession	  is	  merely	  a	  challenge	  
to	  a	  state’s	  claim	  to	  exercise	  sovereignty	  over	  a	  particular	  territory	  or	  people.	  	  As	  
one	  theorist	  points	  out,	  “the	  secessionist	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  state’s	  authority	  as	  such,	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but	  only	  its	  authority	  over	  her	  and	  the	  other	  members	  of	  her	  group	  and	  the	  territory	  
they	  occupy.”	  3	  	  
I	  also	  need	  a	  way	  to	  distinguish	  the	  various	  groups	  involved	  in	  a	  secessionary	  
debate	  or	  conflict.	  	  By	  ‘non-­‐state	  group’	  I	  mean	  the	  ethnic,	  political,	  or	  otherwise	  
distinguishable	  group	  that	  is	  seeking	  secession	  and	  statehood.	  	  “Separatists”	  is	  the	  
more	  commonly	  used	  term,	  but	  I	  feel	  that	  it	  comes	  with	  prejudicial	  connotations.	  	  
And	  by	  ‘host-­‐state’	  I	  mean	  the	  internationally	  recognized	  state	  from	  which	  the	  non-­‐
state	  group	  is	  seeking	  secession.	  	  Let	  me	  use	  an	  example	  to	  illustrate.	  	  If	  Scotland	  is	  
seeking	  secession	  from	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  then	  the	  Scottish	  are	  the	  non-­‐state	  
group	  and	  the	  UK	  is	  the	  host-­‐state,	  represented	  by	  the	  official	  government	  of	  the	  UK.	  
The	  Modern	  Genesis	  of	  Secession	  
	   The	  modern	  history	  of	  secession	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  summer	  of	  1776,	  
when	  fifty-­‐six	  Britons	  signed	  a	  letter	  to	  King	  George	  III	  of	  Great	  Britain	  announcing	  
their	  political,	  economic,	  and	  military	  independence	  and	  new	  status	  as	  a	  sovereign	  
nation.	  	  It	  was	  the	  first	  such	  declaration	  of	  separation	  since	  the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  
developed	  our	  modern	  understanding	  of	  a	  right	  to	  sovereignty:	  it	  was	  
unprecedented.	  	  
While	  much	  of	  the	  actual	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  is	  spent	  
cataloging	  the	  colonists’	  specific	  grievances	  against	  the	  British	  Crown,	  their	  
fundamental	  and	  more	  universal	  argument	  can	  be	  boiled	  down	  to	  a	  couple	  lines.	  	  
“To	  secure	  these	  [universal,	  God-­‐given]	  rights,	  governments	  are	  instituted	  among	  
men,	  deriving	  their	  just	  powers	  from	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  governed	  [and]	  whenever	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Allen	  Buchanan,	  “Toward	  a	  Theory	  of	  Secession,”	  Ethics	  101,	  no.	  2	  (1991):	  326.	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any	  form	  of	  government	  becomes	  destructive	  of	  these	  ends,	  it	  is	  the	  right	  of	  the	  
people	  to	  alter	  or	  to	  abolish	  it,	  and	  to	  institute	  new	  government…”4	  	  Nearing	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  document	  they	  conclude,	  “We,	  therefore,	  …	  by	  authority	  of	  the	  good	  people	  of	  
these	  colonies,	  solemnly	  publish	  and	  declare	  that	  these	  United	  Colonies	  are,	  and	  of	  
right	  ought	  to	  be	  free	  and	  independent	  states.”5	  
The	  signers	  of	  the	  US	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  ask	  the	  question,	  ‘do	  they,	  
as	  a	  group	  of	  people,	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secession?’	  	  Their	  answer	  is	  two-­‐part.	  First,	  they	  
find	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  right	  belonging	  to	  the	  people	  governed,	  not	  a	  government.	  	  
And	  second,	  since	  sovereignty	  derives	  from	  the	  governed,	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  
withdraw	  their	  consent	  to	  be	  governed	  and	  institute	  a	  new	  government:	  that	  is,	  
there	  is	  a	  right	  to	  secede.	  	  While	  this	  first	  finding	  seems	  universal,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what,	  
if	  any,	  preconditions	  the	  separatists	  believed	  needed	  to	  be	  met	  for	  a	  people	  to	  justly	  
withdraw	  their	  consent	  and	  secede.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  American	  colonists	  
did	  believe	  that	  they	  had	  a	  right	  and	  just	  cause	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  British	  Empire.	  	  
King	  George	  III	  disagreed.	  
In	  1783,	  after	  years	  of	  violent	  confrontation,	  British	  and	  American	  
representatives	  met	  in	  Paris	  and	  signed	  a	  peace	  treaty.	  	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Paris	  gave	  the	  
Americans	  exactly	  what	  they	  had	  asked	  for	  in	  their	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  
complete	  freedom	  and	  independence	  for	  each	  of	  the	  thirteen	  signatory	  North	  
American	  colonies:	  each	  colony	  had	  won	  its	  independence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  US	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  (note:	  I	  modernized	  and	  standardized	  the	  syntax	  
for	  reading	  ease).	  
5	  US	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  (note:	  I	  modernized	  and	  standardized	  the	  syntax	  
for	  reading	  ease).	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The	  American	  Revolutionaries	  had	  successfully	  defended	  the	  lofty	  language	  
of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  	  Through	  bloody	  battles	  and	  generally	  
miserable	  living	  conditions,	  the	  soldiers	  of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  had	  defended	  
those	  two	  key	  findings:	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  right	  of	  the	  people	  to	  be	  governed	  and,	  since	  
sovereignty	  derives	  from	  the	  governed,	  people	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secede.	  
But,	  strangely	  no	  precedent	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  set	  by	  American	  
independence,	  even	  the	  American	  position	  lacked	  consistency	  in	  the	  years	  that	  
followed.	  	  In	  1860,	  another	  non-­‐state	  group	  attempted	  to	  declare	  independence,	  this	  
time	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  While	  the	  Confederate	  States	  of	  America	  never	  wrote	  a	  
single	  unified	  declaration	  of	  independence,	  South	  Carolina,	  Mississippi,	  Texas,	  and	  
Georgia	  all	  wrote	  declarations	  of	  independence.6	  	  The	  case	  presented	  in	  South	  
Carolina’s	  “Declaration	  of	  the	  Immediate	  Causes	  Which	  Induce	  and	  Justify	  the	  
Secession	  of	  South	  Carolina	  from	  the	  Federal	  Union,”	  parallels	  the	  arguments	  in	  the	  
1776	  declaration	  quite	  closely.	  	  Like	  the	  1776	  declaration,	  South	  Carolina’s	  1860	  
declaration	  lists	  the	  grievances	  that	  lead	  to	  its	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  “Federal	  
Union.”	  	  But,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  writers	  directly	  reference	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  
original	  declaration	  of	  independence,	  “thus	  were	  established	  [by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Paris,	  
1983]	  the	  two	  great	  principles	  asserted	  by	  the	  Colonies	  [in	  the	  US	  Declaration	  of	  
Independence],	  namely:	  the	  right	  of	  a	  State	  to	  govern	  itself;	  and	  the	  right	  of	  a	  people	  
to	  abolish	  a	  Government	  when	  it	  becomes	  destructive	  of	  the	  ends	  for	  which	  it	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Immediate	  Causes	  Which	  Induce	  and	  Justify	  the	  Secession	  of	  
South	  Carolina	  from	  the	  Federal	  Union”	  
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp	  (last	  accessed	  December	  27,	  
2012).	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instituted.”7	  	  Finding	  that	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  has	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  
obligations	  to	  the	  people	  of	  South	  Carolina,	  the	  signers	  suggest	  a	  third	  principle	  is	  
also	  found	  in	  the	  1776	  Declaration	  of	  Independence:	  the	  law	  of	  compact,	  which	  
holds	  that	  if	  one	  party	  violates	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  compact	  (contractual	  obligation),	  then	  
the	  other	  party(ies)	  are	  not	  bound	  to	  it	  either.8	  	  Thus,	  because	  the	  sovereignty	  
derives	  from	  the	  people	  and	  they	  can	  withdraw	  it	  at	  anytime,	  and	  because	  the	  
United	  States	  has	  failed	  its	  contractual	  obligations	  to	  South	  Carolina	  (and	  the	  larger	  
South),	  South	  Carolina	  has	  a	  right	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  Union.	  	  The	  Lincoln	  
Administration	  and	  the	  members	  of	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  did	  not	  agree.	  	  It	  seems	  
that,	  for	  them,	  the	  right	  to	  secession	  was	  not	  universal	  (if	  they	  believed	  it	  existed	  at	  
all)	  and	  the	  South	  did	  not	  have	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  a	  right	  to	  secede.	  	  
This	  inconsistency	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  inability	  to	  take	  a	  
consistent	  stance	  on	  this	  question	  of	  whether	  geographically	  contiguous	  non-­‐states	  
can	  declare	  independence.	  	  Not	  even	  a	  generation	  after	  the	  American	  Civil	  War,	  the	  
United	  State	  found	  itself	  involved	  in	  new	  independence	  struggles:	  Cuba,	  Texas,	  and	  
California	  just	  to	  name	  a	  few	  in	  close	  proximity.	  	  American	  history	  is	  rife	  with	  
inconsistency	  on	  this	  issue	  and	  the	  US	  has	  supported	  and	  worked	  against	  various	  
independence	  movements	  around	  the	  world,	  seemingly	  with	  little	  consistency.	  	  
Even	  more	  recently,	  the	  US	  supported	  the	  independence	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo,	  but	  
seemed	  ambivalent	  towards	  Tibet	  and	  one	  Washington	  Post	  columnist	  described	  
American	  policy	  towards	  Chechnya	  as	  “two-­‐faced,”	  suggesting	  that	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Ibid.	  
8	  Ibid.	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agencies	  within	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  could	  not	  even	  develop	  a	  consistent	  policy	  
for	  this	  single	  case.9	  	  	  
In	  short,	  even	  the	  United	  States	  seems	  inconsistent	  on	  this	  issue,	  despite	  the	  
claims	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  found	  in	  its	  key	  founding	  documents.	  	  While	  no	  two	  
events	  are	  the	  same,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  this	  hypocrisy.	  	  And,	  I	  find	  myself	  asking	  
why	  that	  is.	  	  
In	  all	  fairness,	  the	  question,	  ‘do	  non-­‐states	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secession?,’	  is	  a	  
question	  that	  nearly	  all	  established	  nations	  must	  ask	  continuously	  and	  on	  which	  few	  
nations	  seem	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  consistent	  stance.	  	  It	  can	  easily	  be	  suggested	  that	  
the	  reason	  behind	  this	  inconsistency	  is	  that	  states	  support	  secession	  and	  
independence	  only	  when	  it	  is	  in	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest.	  	  There	  is	  certainly	  some	  
evidence	  to	  this	  assertion.	  	  I	  could	  end	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  problem	  here,	  but	  I	  fear	  
this	  answer’s	  cynicism	  works	  to	  upstage	  other	  possible	  answers	  and	  even	  hurts	  
itself	  by	  preventing	  further	  exploration	  of	  how	  states	  can	  get	  away	  with	  such	  
inconsistency.	  	  The	  question	  deserves	  further	  exploration.	  
Ignoring	  the	  cynical	  reasons	  for	  this	  disconnect	  that	  are	  often	  thrown	  
around,	  perhaps	  what	  makes	  this	  question	  so	  difficult	  are	  all	  the	  issues	  hidden	  
within	  the	  main	  question.	  	  Included	  in	  this	  large	  question	  are	  a	  plethora	  of	  other,	  
sub-­‐questions	  that	  need	  an	  answer.	  	  For	  example,	  what	  is	  sovereignty;	  what	  is	  a	  
state	  and	  what	  is	  a	  non-­‐state?	  	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  have	  a	  right	  in	  international	  
relations/international	  law;	  and	  from	  where	  do	  any	  rights	  derive?	  	  What	  sort	  of	  
criteria	  need	  be	  meet	  for	  a	  territory	  to	  justly	  exercise	  that	  right	  to	  sovereignty;	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Anne	  Applebaum,	  “Two-­‐Faced	  Chechnya	  Policy,”	  Washington	  Post,	  June	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there	  a	  minimum	  support	  threshold	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  met?	  	  What	  role	  should	  various	  
actors	  play	  in	  disputes	  of	  this	  nature?	  	  	  
Is	  This	  Even	  an	  International	  Issue?	  
Perhaps	  the	  first	  question	  that	  needs	  answering	  is	  whether	  this	  is	  an	  
international	  issue	  or	  a	  domestic	  issue,	  best	  resolved	  at	  the	  state	  level.	  	  One	  could	  
make	  the	  case,	  and	  many	  nations	  have,	  that	  issues	  of	  secession,	  separation,	  and	  
independence	  are	  issues	  of	  a	  domestic	  nature	  since	  the	  debate	  necessarily	  centers	  
on	  disagreements	  between	  internal	  actors.	  	  	  However,	  this	  argument	  has	  some	  key	  
flaws.	  
Recent	  examples	  show	  that	  this	  type	  of	  conflict	  very	  often	  develops	  a	  violent	  
component.	  	  The	  Uppsala	  Armed	  Conflict	  Database	  lists	  37	  ongoing	  conflicts	  in	  the	  
2011	  calendar	  year.10	  	  Twenty-­‐seven	  of	  those	  conflicts	  were	  intrastate,	  meaning	  a	  
“conflict	  that	  occurs	  between	  the	  government	  of	  a	  state	  and	  one	  or	  more	  internal	  
opposition	  group(s).”11	  	  Nine	  of	  those	  conflicts	  were	  “internationalized,”	  which	  is	  
defined	  as	  conflict	  that	  “occurs	  between	  the	  government	  of	  a	  state	  and	  one	  or	  more	  
internal	  opposition	  groups	  with	  intervention	  from	  other	  states	  on	  one	  or	  both	  
sides.”12	  	  In	  the	  simplest	  terms,	  36	  of	  these	  37	  conflicts	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
intrastate,	  since	  they	  share	  this	  basic	  government/opposition	  group	  dyad	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program,	  “Homepage,”	  Uppsala	  University	  Department	  of	  
Peace	  and	  Conflict	  Research,	  	  
<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset
/>	  	  (last	  accessed	  April	  6,	  2013).	  
11	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program,	  “UCDP/PRIO	  Armed	  Conflict	  Dataset	  Codebook”	  
Version	  4-­‐2012,	  
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/118/118670_codebook_ucdp_prio-­‐armed-­‐
conflict-­‐dataset-­‐v4_2012.pdf	  (last	  accessed	  April	  6,	  2013):	  9.	  
12	  Ibid.,	  9.	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component.	  	  The	  single	  remaining	  conflict	  is	  described	  as	  interstate.	  	  As	  I	  suggested	  
earlier,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  two	  types	  of	  intrastate	  warfare:	  secessions	  and	  revolutions.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  that	  of	  the	  37	  ongoing	  world	  conflicts,	  36	  of	  them	  relate	  
in	  some	  way	  to	  this	  question	  posed	  by	  the	  US	  Declaration	  of	  Independence:	  from	  
where	  does	  sovereignty	  derive.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  significant	  subset	  of	  those	  conflicts	  
directly	  ask	  questions	  about	  whether	  and	  how	  a	  non-­‐state	  achieves	  independence	  
and	  statehood,	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  for	  these	  groups.	  
When	  these	  secessionary	  conflicts	  turn	  violent,	  they	  can	  likely	  lead	  to	  a	  
whole	  host	  of	  other,	  related	  international	  issues.	  	  Refugees	  and	  externally	  displaced	  
people	  become	  an	  issue	  as	  people	  flee	  the	  danger	  posed	  by	  an	  escalating	  conflict.	  	  	  
Migration	  –	  especially	  the	  rapid	  and	  large-­‐scale	  migration	  often	  created	  by	  refugees	  
–	  poses	  a	  serious	  security	  threat	  to	  the	  region	  surrounding	  the	  conflict.	  	  Refugees	  
can	  be	  major	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  burdens	  on	  the	  state	  providing	  
sanctuary.	  
Additionally,	  one	  of	  the	  incidental	  differences	  between	  secession	  and	  
revolution	  is	  the	  nationalistic	  component	  that	  is	  often	  found	  in	  secession,	  which	  
revolutions	  usually	  lack.	  	  History	  has	  shown	  that	  these	  non-­‐state	  groups	  who	  are	  
ethnic	  minorities	  sometimes	  become	  victims	  of	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  genocide	  
campaigns.	  	  In	  fact,	  as	  impetus	  for	  establishing	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  the	  
International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty	  cited	  four	  recent	  
cases	  of	  international	  failure	  in	  the	  face	  of	  genocide;	  two	  of	  the	  four	  were	  the	  result	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of	  conflicts	  that	  started	  as	  independence	  movements.13	  	  While	  international	  action	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  genocide	  has	  been	  haphazard	  at	  best,	  genocide	  prevention,	  and	  
punishments	  for	  acts	  of	  genocide,	  are	  well	  developed	  in	  international	  law	  and	  
politics.14	  
For	  an	  international	  community	  that	  values	  peace,	  the	  issue	  of	  secession	  is	  an	  
important	  issue	  in-­‐and-­‐of	  itself.	  	  The	  international	  nature	  of	  this	  issue	  is	  further	  
reinforced	  by	  the	  practice	  and	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Rhetorically	  speaking,	  
the	  UN	  leadership	  and	  many	  of	  its	  documents	  speak	  of	  a	  right	  to	  the	  “self-­‐
determination”	  of	  peoples	  (explored	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  2)	  and	  of	  protecting	  the	  
political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  rights	  of	  individuals.	  	  But,	  the	  UN	  acts,	  not	  just	  
rhetorically,	  but	  in	  practice	  too.	  	  In	  practice,	  the	  UN	  quite	  often	  finds	  itself	  compelled	  
to	  approve,	  fund,	  and	  run	  peacekeeping	  missions	  in	  areas	  where	  independence	  
conflict	  has	  torn	  a	  nation	  apart,	  now	  in	  increasingly	  intrusive	  and	  holistic	  ways.15	  
But,	  even	  if	  internal	  UN	  politics	  prevents	  a	  UN	  response,	  sympathetic	  nations	  
can	  and	  do	  still	  act	  and	  work	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  one	  side.	  	  Outside	  the	  UN	  system,	  
nations	  have	  tools	  like	  economic	  and	  political	  sanctions,	  arms	  and	  military	  supplies,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty,	  The	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  (Ottawa,	  Canada:	  International	  Development	  Research	  
Centre,	  2001),	  1.	  
14	  The	  1948	  Genocide	  Convention	  defines	  and	  establishes	  the	  illegality	  of	  genocide	  
and	  the	  international	  community	  has	  formed	  various	  courts	  to	  punish	  it:	  Nuremburg	  
Military	  Tribunals,	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  Rwanda,	  and	  now	  cases	  of	  genocide	  are	  handled	  
by	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court.	  
15	  Paul	  F.	  Diehl	  and	  Daniel	  Druckman,	  Evaluating	  Peace	  Operations	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  
Reinner,	  2010).	  	  Diehl	  and	  Druckman	  provide	  a	  through	  discussion	  of	  non-­‐
traditional	  peacekeeping.	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and	  selective	  humanitarian	  aid	  they	  can	  use	  to	  support	  a	  favored	  side	  and	  oppose	  
the	  other.	  
In	  short,	  while	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  view	  the	  debate	  over	  a	  specific	  secession	  as	  a	  
domestic	  issue,	  experience	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  resulting	  conflict	  often	  makes	  it	  an	  
international	  issue.	  	  And,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  conflict,	  and	  the	  host-­‐state	  simply	  allows	  
the	  secession,	  the	  act	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  state	  is	  necessarily	  an	  international	  relations	  
issue	  too.	  
Concluding	  Thoughts	  and	  Next	  Steps	  
	   So	  far,	  I	  have	  argued	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  issue.	  	  Secession	  movements	  have	  
the	  potential	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  lot	  of	  negative	  consequences.	  	  Early	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  
cited	  casualty	  figures	  from	  four	  conflicts	  to	  highlight	  the	  range	  of	  casualties	  that	  we	  
have	  seen	  resulting	  from	  declarations	  of	  independence	  (ranging	  from	  3,000	  to	  one	  
million),	  however	  those	  four	  cases	  are	  just	  a	  small	  sampling	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  issue.	  	  
The	  loss	  of	  life	  from	  independence	  struggles	  around	  this	  world	  is	  large	  and	  tragic.	  	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  military	  and	  civilian	  loss	  of	  life	  that	  results	  from	  any	  war,	  
unilateral	  declarations	  of	  independence	  often	  carry	  another	  potential	  loss	  of	  life	  
scenario:	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  genocide.	  	  Often	  independence	  movements	  are	  
nationalistically	  based	  (the	  Kurds	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Kosovo,	  Bosnia,	  Slovenia,	  
Croatia	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  Basques	  in	  Spain	  and	  France).	  	  For	  these	  
reasons,	  I	  firmly	  believe	  this	  is	  an	  important	  issue.	  
	   This	  project	  continues	  in	  two	  substantive	  chapters.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  will	  
trace	  secession	  in	  international	  law	  via	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  Beginning	  
with	  early	  conceptions	  of	  Wilsonian	  self-­‐determination,	  and	  continuing	  to	  the	  status	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of	  that	  right	  today,	  I	  find	  that	  while	  a	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  still	  exists,	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  does	  not.	  
In	  the	  third	  chapter,	  I	  will	  address	  the	  important	  scholarly	  perspectives	  of	  
what	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  should	  or	  might	  look	  like.	  	  Combining	  systems	  developed	  
by	  two	  scholars,	  working	  from	  different	  perspectives,	  I	  catalogue	  and	  categorize	  the	  
perspectives	  and	  writers.	  	  I	  will	  also	  compare	  and	  contrast	  the	  points	  of	  view,	  
exploring	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  
It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  this	  project	  will	  contribute	  three	  things	  to	  the	  field.	  	  First,	  
to	  my	  knowledge	  no	  work	  on	  this	  topic	  has	  covered	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  interdisciplinary	  
way	  I	  hope	  to	  in	  this	  work.	  	  From	  my	  reading,	  there	  are	  two	  separate	  ongoing	  
conversations:	  one	  in	  international	  law	  scholarship	  and	  another	  in	  normative	  IR	  
theory.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  this	  work	  engages	  each	  subfield	  and	  brings	  their	  
perspectives	  into	  a	  single,	  unified	  work.	  	  Second,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  work	  has	  yet	  
tried	  to	  organize	  the	  normative	  perspectives	  in	  a	  truly	  non-­‐partisan	  manner.	  	  Those	  
works	  that	  do	  organize	  the	  perspectives	  seem	  to	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  strike	  down	  
several	  authors	  in	  one	  fell	  swoop.	  	  Here,	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  engage	  each	  perspective	  
with	  objectivity	  and	  fairness.	  	  Finally,	  while	  I	  try	  to	  remain	  objective	  in	  the	  third	  
chapter,	  I	  do	  plan	  to	  contribute	  something	  more	  unique	  to	  the	  normative	  literature.	  	  
In	  the	  final	  chapter,	  I	  offer	  a	  few	  additional	  thoughts	  on	  what	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  
should	  look	  like	  and	  I	  try	  to	  address	  criticisms	  of	  my	  perspective	  in	  new	  ways.	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Secession	  in	  International	  Law	  
	   Even	  accepting	  my	  argument	  from	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that,	  secession	  is	  an	  
international	  issue,	  it	  may	  seem	  strange	  to	  include	  a	  chapter	  on	  international	  law	  in	  
a	  thesis	  searching	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  To	  some,	  international	  law	  seems	  only	  
concerned	  with	  the	  interactions	  of	  states.	  	  And	  true,	  for	  many	  international	  courts	  
and	  organizations,	  states	  are	  the	  only	  actors	  that	  matter.	  	  However,	  things	  may	  not	  
be	  quite	  so	  black	  and	  white;	  I	  think	  two	  important	  counter	  points	  go	  a	  long	  way	  
toward	  justifying	  a	  search	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  international	  law.	  
First,	  while	  much	  of	  international	  law	  is	  only	  really	  concerned	  with	  how	  
states	  treat	  each	  other,	  some	  laws	  now	  exist	  that	  deal	  with	  how	  states	  treat	  their	  
own	  people,	  and	  they	  have	  existed	  for	  a	  while.	  	  Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  examples	  
is	  the	  Genocide	  Convention	  (1948).16	  	  Here,	  the	  international	  community	  renders	  
illegal	  a	  whole	  class	  of	  actions	  previously	  available	  to	  a	  state,	  theoretically	  available	  
at	  least.	  	  In	  the	  Genocide	  Convention,	  the	  international	  community	  declares	  how	  a	  
state	  cannot	  treat	  the	  people	  within	  its	  boarders.	  	  Admittedly	  this	  is	  an	  extreme	  
example	  and	  a	  couple	  other	  examples	  can	  also	  be	  found:	  most	  notably,	  the	  
International	  Bill	  of	  Human	  Rights.17	  
	  The	  second	  point	  is	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  legal	  personhood	  seems	  to	  have	  
changed	  a	  little,	  too.	  	  One	  example	  is	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  which	  confers	  
legal	  personhood	  on	  individuals	  in	  its	  mission	  to	  enforce	  international	  legal	  statutes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  “Genocide	  Convention,”	  December	  9,	  1948,	  available	  at	  
<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html>	  (last	  accessed	  April	  12,	  2013).	  
17	  Though,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  as	  will	  all	  treaties,	  each	  state	  must	  voluntarily	  sign	  
and	  ratify	  these	  treaties	  for	  them	  to	  take	  effect.	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condemning	  genocide,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  war	  crimes,	  and	  crimes	  of	  
aggression.18	  	  It	  seems	  then,	  that	  international	  law	  is	  not	  solely	  concerned	  with	  the	  
interactions	  of	  states,	  but	  does	  have	  a	  few	  treaties	  and	  laws	  that	  impact	  how	  a	  state	  
conducts	  itself	  within	  its	  own	  boundaries.	  	  	  	  
Even	  if	  international	  law	  does	  sometime	  work	  within	  the	  state,	  protecting	  
people	  against	  their	  government,	  what	  would	  drive	  the	  international	  community	  to	  
create	  law	  on	  this	  particular	  topic?	  	  To	  answer	  that	  I	  return	  to	  a	  couple	  points	  I	  
made	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  	  An	  important	  goal	  of	  international	  law	  seems	  to	  be	  promoting	  
peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  world.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  secession	  can	  
dramatically	  undermine	  those	  goals.	  	  A	  secessionary	  debate	  that	  devolves	  can	  lead	  
to	  civil	  war	  and	  genocide,	  and	  can	  create	  large	  numbers	  of	  refugees	  very	  quickly.	  	  All	  
these	  are	  things	  the	  international	  community	  seeks	  to	  avoid	  and	  often	  things	  the	  
international	  community	  feels	  compelled	  to	  respond	  to	  with	  interventions.	  	  It	  would	  
make	  sense	  for	  international	  law	  to	  contain	  some	  procedure	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  
in	  an	  effort	  to	  mitigate	  those	  consequences.	  	  This	  chapter	  is	  a	  search	  for	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  in	  international	  law.	  
	   There	  seems	  to	  be	  just	  a	  few	  ways	  to	  gain	  independence	  in	  international	  law.	  	  
A	  non-­‐state	  could	  fight	  for	  and	  win	  independence	  from	  the	  host	  state,	  as	  the	  United	  
States	  did.19	  	  A	  non-­‐state	  can	  push	  for	  referenda	  on	  secession,	  as	  South	  Sudan	  
recently	  did.	  	  A	  non-­‐state	  can	  quietly	  leave	  during	  the	  implosion	  of	  the	  host	  state,	  as	  
Somaliland	  effectively	  has.	  	  A	  non-­‐state	  could	  have	  its	  independence	  viewed	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  “Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Courts,”	  November	  10,	  1998,	  
available	  at	  <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm>	  (last	  accessed	  
April	  12,	  2013).	  
19	  Though,	  the	  legality	  of	  this	  path	  is	  dubious.	  
	   15	  
	  
politically	  expedient,	  as	  happened	  with	  Belgium.	  	  However,	  these	  paths	  are	  either	  
too	  violent	  or	  unworkable	  in	  many	  cases.	  	  The	  other	  option	  is	  for	  a	  non-­‐state	  to	  find	  
its	  right	  to	  secession	  through	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  
	  This	  chapter	  specifically	  looks	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐
determination.	  	  Self-­‐determination	  offers	  a	  few	  strengths	  these	  other	  paths	  lack.	  	  
First,	  self-­‐determination	  is	  accessible;	  all	  peoples	  have	  a	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  
as	  per	  international	  law:	  self-­‐determination	  applies	  in	  more	  than	  just	  a	  handful	  of	  
cases	  –	  I	  will	  explore	  that	  momentarily.	  	  Second,	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  is	  
well	  established	  in	  international	  law.	  	  And	  third,	  many	  states	  have	  actually	  used	  self-­‐
determination	  to	  secede	  successfully.	  
This	  chapter	  continues	  in	  two	  parts.	  	  First,	  I	  trace	  the	  origin	  and	  evolution	  of	  
self-­‐determination.	  	  However,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  self-­‐determination	  does	  not	  seem	  be	  
the	  legal	  foundation	  of	  future	  secession	  and	  independence	  movements.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  
conclude	  with	  a	  look	  at	  the	  current	  state	  of	  secession	  and	  independence	  in	  
international	  law.	  
What	  is	  Self-­Determination?20	  
Self-­determination	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  given	  people	  should	  be	  able	  to	  ‘determine’	  
their	  government.	  	  At	  its	  core,	  it	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  should	  have	  a	  say	  in	  who	  
governs	  them	  and	  under	  what	  terms	  they	  are	  to	  be	  governed.	  	  There	  is	  a	  problem	  
though.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  international	  law,	  this	  definition	  of	  self-­‐determination	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  sections	  of	  this	  paper	  on	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  the	  Kosovo	  decision	  are	  
adapted	  from	  a	  paper	  written	  for	  a	  Directed	  Readings	  course	  I	  completed	  in	  the	  fall	  
of	  2012	  with	  Mariya	  Omelicheva.	  	  The	  course	  largely	  focused	  on	  International	  
Humanitarian	  Law.	  	  The	  original	  paper	  was	  entitled	  “Self-­‐Determination,	  Secession,	  
and	  Kosovo’s	  Struggle	  for	  Independence.”	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is	  vague:	  it	  seems	  to	  raise	  more	  questions	  than	  it	  answers.	  	  What	  is	  a	  people:	  one,	  
ten,	  fifty-­‐thousand;	  do	  they	  need	  to	  share	  a	  culture,	  language,	  or	  religion?	  	  What	  
does	  it	  actually	  mean	  to	  determine	  your	  government:	  vote	  in	  free/fair	  elections	  or	  
write	  a	  new	  constitution	  for	  a	  whole	  new	  state?	  	  I	  could	  have	  written	  a	  definition	  
that	  answered	  these	  questions	  and	  pre-­‐empted	  others,	  but	  perversely,	  it	  would	  have	  
actually	  been	  more	  incomplete.	  	  	  
As	  I	  will	  demonstrate,	  the	  concept	  of	  self-­‐determination	  has	  gone	  through	  an	  
interesting	  evolution.	  	  Over	  time,	  self-­‐determination	  has	  been	  used	  to	  justify	  many	  
related	  actions,	  which	  “include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to,	  secession,	  freedom	  from	  
colonial	  domination,	  integration	  with	  an	  existing	  state,	  limited	  autonomy	  within	  a	  
state,	  and	  protection	  of	  minority	  groups.”21	  	  The	  problem	  with	  my	  definition	  is	  that	  
it	  is	  vague	  and	  actually	  leads	  to	  two	  separate	  understandings	  of	  what	  self-­‐
determination	  means:	  external	  and	  internal	  self-­‐determination.	  Internal	  self-­‐
determination	  is	  the	  right	  to	  pursue	  “political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  
development	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  an	  existing	  state	  (emphasis	  in	  the	  original)”	  
with	  external	  being	  the	  older	  understanding	  that	  necessitates	  independence	  to	  
realize	  those	  goals.22	  	  The	  external	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  closely	  mirrors	  a	  right	  
to	  secession.	  	  But	  as	  I	  will	  show,	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  has	  been	  
reinterpreted	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  an	  internal	  right	  most	  recently.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Amy	  Maguire,	  “Law	  Protecting	  Rights:	  Restoring	  the	  law	  of	  self-­‐determination	  in	  
the	  neo-­‐colonial	  world,”	  Law	  Text	  Culture	  vol.	  12	  (2008):	  15.	  
22	  Mauro	  Barelli,	  “Shaping	  Indigenous	  Self-­‐Determination:	  Promising	  or	  
Unsatisfactory	  Solutions?,”	  International	  Community	  Law	  Review	  13	  (2011):	  415;	  
Maguire,	  27.	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World	  War	  One	  and	  Wilsonian	  Self-­Determination	  
Much	  changed	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  relations	  following	  the	  First	  World	  
War.	  	  Key	  among	  the	  changes	  was	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  international	  law.	  	  The	  
level	  of	  violence	  and	  bloodshed	  witnessed	  during	  the	  war	  appalled	  Western	  leaders.	  	  
An	  unchecked	  system	  of	  exclusive	  bilateral	  treaties	  had	  created	  two	  alarmingly	  
powerful	  sides	  and	  sparked	  a	  messy	  world	  war.	  	  Multilateral	  international	  law	  (a	  
system	  of	  non-­‐exclusive	  universal	  treaties)	  seemed	  like	  a	  better	  way	  forward:	  a	  way	  
to	  create	  a	  single	  world	  order	  and	  unite	  the	  global	  powers.	  	  As	  a	  symbol	  of	  that	  
single	  side	  and	  new	  unity,	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  was	  created	  and	  the	  world	  signed	  
onto	  a	  new	  set	  of	  rules.23	  
	   But,	  just	  meeting	  periodically	  in	  Geneva	  was	  not	  quite	  enough.	  	  For	  the	  Allied	  
Powers,	  creating	  a	  single	  world	  order	  also	  meant	  breaking	  up	  the	  antagonistic	  
“multi-­‐ethnic	  empires:”	  namely	  the	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  and	  Ottoman	  Empires.	  	  To	  
that	  end,	  this	  ‘right	  of	  self-­‐determination’	  enters	  the	  Western	  lexicon.	  	  	  
Many	  scholars	  trace	  the	  roots	  of	  modern	  self-­‐determination	  to	  Woodrow	  
Wilson.	  	  One	  author	  even	  suggests	  that	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  coined	  the	  term	  “self-­‐
determination.”24	  	  As	  Wilson	  understood	  self-­‐determination,	  it	  was	  “a	  scheme	  
whereby	  identifiable	  people	  were	  to	  be	  accorded	  Statehood;	  the	  fate	  of	  disputed	  
border	  areas	  was	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  the	  plebiscite;	  and	  those	  ethnic	  groups	  too	  small	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Though	  the	  concept	  of	  “international	  law”	  certainly	  predates	  WWI,	  the	  scope	  and	  
strength	  of	  international	  law	  increased	  substantially	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war.	  
24	  Marija	  Batistich,	  “The	  Right	  to	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  International	  Law,”	  
Auckland	  University	  Law	  Review	  (1992):	  1016.	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or	  too	  dispersed…were	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  protection	  of	  minority	  regimes,	  
supervised	  by…the	  League	  of	  Nations.”25	  	  	  
	   The	  logic	  behind	  this	  move	  is	  very	  political	  and	  apparent.	  	  By	  breaking	  up	  
these	  large	  empires,	  Wilson	  and	  the	  other	  victorious	  leaders	  hoped	  that	  the	  defeated	  
empires	  would	  be	  too	  weak	  to	  rise	  again	  and	  restart	  war,	  hoping	  for	  a	  more	  
favorable	  conclusion.	  	  By	  framing	  the	  division	  these	  empires	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  right	  to	  
self-­‐determination	  for	  their	  peoples,	  Wilson	  and	  the	  other	  leaders	  attempted	  to	  
cloak	  their	  actions.	  	  “The	  political	  separation	  of	  ethnic	  minorities	  was	  perceived	  by	  
the	  allies	  as	  a	  convenient	  way	  of	  dissecting	  the	  European	  territories	  of	  the	  
conquered.”26	  	  That	  is,	  they	  were	  not	  arbitrarily	  breaking	  up	  a	  once-­‐great	  empire	  as	  
an	  act	  of	  retribution;	  but	  rather,	  they	  were	  helping	  these	  peoples	  realize	  a	  right	  that	  
these	  vanquished	  empires	  had	  long	  denied	  them:	  a	  right	  to	  self-­‐determine;	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  and	  independence.	  	  Following	  World	  War	  One,	  self-­‐determination	  meant	  
independence	  for	  many	  nations	  formerly	  part	  of	  the	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  and	  Ottoman	  
Empires.	  
While	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  right	  helped	  establish	  a	  justification	  for	  redrawing	  
the	  maps	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  Near	  East,	  a	  couple	  key	  things	  remain	  important	  to	  keep	  
in	  mind.	  	  First,	  while	  self-­‐determination	  remains	  a	  very	  vague	  term,	  it	  manages	  to	  
acquire	  a	  specific	  connotation.	  	  Probably	  owing	  to	  the	  way	  Wilson	  describes	  “self-­‐
determination”	  and	  the	  way	  it	  was	  practiced,	  it	  becomes	  closely	  associated	  with	  
independence.	  	  This	  is	  key	  because	  the	  language	  of	  self-­‐determination	  will	  dominate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Batistich.	  	  Emphasis	  Added.	  
26	  Batistich,	  1016.	  
	   19	  
	  
the	  debate	  in	  international	  law	  about	  how	  non-­‐states	  gain	  independence	  for	  decades	  
following.	  
Second,	  this	  new	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  is	  not	  a	  codified	  part	  of	  
international	  law	  at	  this	  point.	  	  Again,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  justification	  for	  a	  
policy	  of	  dividing	  the	  defeated	  powers	  after	  World	  War	  One.	  	  It	  does	  not	  get	  built	  
into	  and	  is	  specifically	  excluded	  from	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  and	  its	  
Covenant.27	  	  It	  is	  little	  more	  than	  a	  moral	  justification	  for	  breaking	  up	  the	  Austro-­‐
Hungarian	  and	  Ottoman	  Empires	  following	  the	  close	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War:	  specific	  
language	  for	  talking	  points.28	  	  	  
Almost	  immediately	  questions	  arise	  about	  whether	  self-­‐determination	  
includes	  a	  right	  to	  independence.29	  	  Even	  in	  this	  post-­‐World	  War	  One	  era,	  the	  issue	  
of	  independence	  (and	  any	  guarantee	  thereof)	  is	  tricky	  in	  international	  politics	  and	  
law;	  non-­‐states	  are	  non-­‐states	  because	  someone	  does	  not	  want	  them	  to	  be	  states.	  	  
And,	  true	  independence	  always	  requires	  that	  other	  states	  –	  particularly	  powerful	  
states	  –	  recognize	  your	  independence	  as	  well.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  problem,	  
because,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  while	  self-­‐determination	  is	  understood	  rhetorically	  as	  
a	  right,	  there	  is	  no	  language	  in	  the	  international	  legal	  framework	  guaranteeing	  the	  
right.	  	  But,	  despite	  (or	  perhaps	  because	  of)	  Wilson’s	  splitting	  up	  of	  those	  empires,	  
war	  reignites	  in	  Europe	  and	  this	  League	  of	  Nations	  system	  is	  torn	  apart.	  	  The	  future	  
of	  self-­‐determination	  becomes	  unclear.	  




	   20	  
	  
Self-­Determination	  in	  the	  UN	  System	  
While	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  Covenant	  intentionally	  ignores	  self-­‐
determination,	  it	  appears	  twice	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  	  The	  UN	  Charter	  begins	  with	  a	  list	  
of	  purposes	  for	  the	  organization	  and	  the	  second	  one	  on	  the	  list	  is	  as	  follows,	  “to	  
develop	  friendly	  relations	  among	  nations	  based	  on	  respect	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  
rights	  and	  self-­determination	  of	  peoples,	  and	  to	  take	  other	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  
strengthen	  universal	  peace.”30	  	  Self-­‐determination’s	  second	  appearance	  in	  the	  
Charter	  comes	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  economic	  and	  social	  co-­‐operation:	  “With	  a	  view	  to	  
the	  creation	  of	  conditions	  of	  stability	  and	  well-­‐being	  which	  are	  necessary	  for	  
peaceful	  and	  friendly	  relations	  among	  nations	  based	  on	  respect	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  
equal	  rights	  and	  self-­determination	  of	  peoples,	  the	  United	  Nations	  shall	  promote…”31	  
	   Self-­‐determination	  does	  appear	  in	  these	  two	  rhetorically	  significant	  places,	  it	  
seems	  to	  be	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  UN’s	  mandate.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  important	  problems	  with	  its	  use	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  all	  
relating	  the	  vagueness	  with	  which	  it	  is	  used.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  if	  self-­‐
determination	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  right,	  a	  principle,	  or	  something	  else	  entirely.	  	  It	  
simply	  seems	  as	  though	  the	  UN	  framers	  think	  self-­‐determination	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  and	  
want	  to	  foster	  whatever	  it	  is	  around	  the	  world.	  	  The	  second	  problem	  with	  self-­‐
determination’s	  use	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter	  is	  that	  self-­‐determination	  is	  left	  undefined.32	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  United	  Nations,	  The.	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  San	  Francisco,	  26	  June	  1945,	  
art.	  1,	  sec.	  2.	  Emphasis	  added.	  
31	  UN	  Charter,	  art.	  55.	  Again,	  emphasis	  added.	  
32	  Batishich,	  1018.	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Third,	  to	  whom	  this	  self-­‐determination	  belongs	  remains	  undefined	  and	  unclear	  as	  
well.33	  
	   So,	  while	  this	  right	  of	  self-­‐determination	  seems	  to	  become	  more	  important	  
after	  World	  War	  Two,	  it	  actually	  remains	  largely	  in	  the	  same	  position.	  	  Before	  and	  
after	  World	  War	  Two	  it	  is	  vague	  and	  unclear.	  	  Though,	  as	  with	  self-­‐determination’s	  
use	  before	  World	  War	  Two,	  it	  seems	  to	  remain	  connotatively	  connected	  to	  this	  idea	  
of	  independence.	  	  But,	  much	  was	  left	  up	  to	  future	  generations	  to	  interpret	  and	  
shape.	  
As	  the	  UN	  developed,	  so	  too	  did	  this	  idea	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  now	  written	  
into	  international	  law	  via	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  idea	  of	  
self-­‐determination	  was	  incorporated	  into	  various	  documents.	  	  Part	  I,	  Article	  1,	  of	  
both	  twin	  covenants	  reads	  as	  follows.34	  	  “All	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐
determination.	  By	  virtue	  of	  that	  right	  they	  freely	  determine	  their	  political	  status	  and	  
freely	  pursue	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development.”35	  	  This	  use	  of	  self-­‐
determination	  is	  interesting	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  First,	  the	  language	  suggests	  that	  self-­‐
determination	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  things,	  which	  the	  
UN	  seeks	  to	  promote.	  	  Secondly,	  this	  language	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  is	  pulled,	  
nearly	  verbatim,	  from	  an	  earlier	  UN	  document,	  the	  1960	  General	  Assembly	  
Resolution	  1514,	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Granting	  of	  Independence	  to	  Colonial	  Countries	  
and	  Peoples.	  	  Theoretically,	  this	  inclusion	  of	  language	  from	  Res.	  1514	  in	  a	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Batishich.	  
34	  By	  “twin	  covenants”	  I	  mean	  the	  UN	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  and	  the	  
UN	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social,	  and	  Cultural	  Rights.	  
35	  UN	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights;	  UN	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social,	  and	  
Cultural	  Rights.	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universal	  set	  of	  documents	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  extend	  the	  
privileges	  of	  1514	  to	  peoples	  not	  colonized.	  	  	  
In	  practice,	  however,	  self-­‐determination	  continued	  to	  evolve	  along	  a	  more	  
restrictive	  path	  than	  the	  above	  discussion	  would	  imply.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  self-­‐
determination	  was	  important	  in	  granting	  independence	  to	  nations	  once	  ruled	  by	  the	  
Ottoman	  and	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  empires	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  self-­‐
determination	  became	  an	  important	  part	  of	  granting	  independence	  to	  former	  
colonies	  following	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  “During	  the	  era	  of	  decolonisation,	  the	  
United	  Nations	  defined	  self-­‐determination	  as	  the	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  colonial	  
domination”	  and	  that	  right	  to	  self-­‐determine	  entailed	  a	  right	  to	  independence.36	  	  
This	  right	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  colonial	  power	  was	  often	  largely	  uncontested,	  as	  
colonialism	  had	  outlived	  its	  usefulness	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  Or,	  
as	  one	  scholar	  (referencing	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  twin	  covenants	  and,	  perhaps	  looking	  
through	  rosier	  glasses)	  put	  it,	  “the	  international	  community	  determined	  that	  
colonialism	  impeded	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  human	  rights”	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  a	  concluded	  
chapter	  of	  history.37	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  reason	  behind	  it,	  the	  number	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  states	  grew	  in	  
the	  General	  Assembly	  and	  so	  too	  did	  support	  for	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.38	  	  In	  
1960,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  adopted	  Resolution	  1514,	  a	  declaration	  on	  colonies	  
and	  the	  independence	  process,	  which	  I	  have	  addressed	  a	  bit.	  	  Resolution	  1514	  takes	  
a	  firm	  stand	  in	  its	  affirmation	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  “All	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Batistich,	  1023.	  
37	  Batistich,	  1024.	  
38	  Batistich,	  1025.	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self-­‐determination;	  by	  virtue	  of	  that	  right	  they	  freely	  determine	  their	  political	  status	  
and	  freely	  pursue	  their	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  development.”39	  	  There	  are	  a	  
couple	  key	  points	  to	  make	  here.	  	  First,	  the	  resolution	  clearly	  establishes	  self-­‐
determination	  as	  a	  right,	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  amorphous	  nature	  of	  self-­‐
determination	  as	  found	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter.40	  	  Second,	  it	  offers	  a	  definition	  of	  self-­‐
determination,	  reinforcing	  that	  self-­‐determination	  is	  a	  right	  to	  pursue	  economic,	  
social,	  and	  cultural	  development.	  	  Finally	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  
resolution	  sets	  up	  self-­‐determination	  as	  a	  right	  to	  freely	  determine	  “political	  status.”	  	  
Is	  this	  the	  right	  to	  secession	  and	  ticket	  to	  independence	  through	  international	  law	  
for	  which	  we	  have	  been	  looking?	  
Maybe,	  but	  some	  limitations	  certainly	  still	  exist.	  	  As	  one	  scholar	  notes,	  “The	  
United	  Nations	  Declaration	  [on	  the	  Granting	  of	  Independence	  to	  Colonial	  Countries	  
and	  Peoples]	  recognised	  a	  right	  of	  secession	  not	  for	  ‘peoples’	  at	  all,	  but	  for	  those	  
territories	  that	  happened	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  as	  colonies.”41	  	  
Accepting	  this,	  and	  accepting	  that	  the	  period	  of	  decolonization	  is	  largely	  concluded,	  
the	  logical	  question	  to	  ask	  is	  how	  does	  self-­‐determination	  evolve	  in	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  
world	  and	  what	  is	  it	  now.	  
In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  a	  few	  years	  back,	  Jan	  
Klabbers	  looks	  at	  self-­‐determination	  in	  the	  courts	  from	  1970	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  	  His	  
findings	  are	  important	  because	  they	  shed	  light	  not	  only	  on	  the	  status	  of	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  UNGA,	  Resolution	  1514	  
40	  However,	  the	  universality	  is	  debatable.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  it	  uses	  the	  words	  “all	  
peoples,”	  but	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  document	  is	  pretty	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  a	  document	  on	  
decolonialization.	  
41	  Batistich,	  1025.	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determination	  today,	  but	  also	  how	  this	  chapter	  of	  its	  history	  has	  played	  out.	  	  
Klabbers	  notes	  that	  the	  judicial	  arm	  of	  the	  UN,	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
(ICJ),	  has	  heard	  four	  cases	  where	  self-­‐determinism	  was	  a	  potential	  issue	  during	  
those	  30-­‐odd	  years	  and	  he	  further	  finds	  that	  the	  ICJ’s	  ruling	  on	  those	  cases	  has	  been	  
significant	  in	  two	  key	  ways.42	  	  	  
First,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  first	  ruling,	  the	  ICJ’s	  decisions	  consistently	  
refer	  to	  self-­‐determination	  as	  a	  principle	  –	  though	  at	  times	  both	  ‘principle’	  and	  ‘right’	  
have	  been	  used	  in	  the	  same	  decision.43	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  principles	  carry	  
less	  weight	  than	  rights	  in	  international	  law.	  	  And	  second,	  the	  ICJ	  has	  let	  each	  
opportunity	  to	  comment	  extensively	  on	  self-­‐determination	  pass	  quietly.	  	  Klabbers	  
also	  notes	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  his	  discussion	  that	  other	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  have	  
also	  been	  asked	  to	  rule	  on	  matters	  of	  self-­‐determination	  periodically.	  	  He	  finds	  that	  
they	  have	  worked	  against	  a	  robust	  self-­‐determinism	  too,	  but	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  
While	  the	  ICJ	  has	  worked	  to	  undermine	  self-­‐determination’s	  status	  as	  an	  
international	  legal	  right,	  other	  judicial	  bodies	  have	  worked	  to	  sever	  the	  connection	  
between	  self-­‐determination	  and	  secession	  or	  independence,	  suggesting	  the	  a	  right	  
to	  self-­‐determine	  is	  not	  a	  right	  to	  secede.44	  
Klabbers	  continues,	  since	  the	  1970s	  judicial	  and	  quasi-­‐judicial	  bodies	  have	  
“reconceptualized	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  (virtual)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Klabbers,	  197.	  
The	  four	  cases	  in	  question	  are	  Nambia	  1971,	  Western	  Sahara	  1975,	  The	  Frontier	  
Dispute	  1986,	  &	  East	  Timor	  1995.	  	  The	  ICJ’s	  ruling	  on	  Kosovo	  was	  written	  after	  this	  
article	  and	  will	  be	  addressed	  separately.	  
43	  Jan	  Klabbers,	  “The	  Right	  to	  be	  Taken	  Seriously;	  Self-­‐Determination	  in	  
International	  Law,”	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  28(2006):	  197.	  
44	  Klabbers,	  197-­‐8.	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end	  of	  decolonialization.	  Now	  that	  self-­‐determination	  can	  no	  longer	  simply	  be	  
construed	  as	  a	  right	  of	  colonies	  to	  independence,	  it	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  right	  of	  
peoples	  to	  take	  part	  in	  decisions	  affecting	  their	  future.”45	  	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  
from	  external	  to	  internal	  self-­‐determination.	  	  The	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  is	  no	  
longer	  connected	  to	  independence	  or	  secession;	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  political	  right	  that	  can	  
be	  exercised	  within	  the	  host	  state.	  	  “Beyond	  the	  decolonisation	  context,	  the	  
nationalist	  component	  of	  self-­‐determination	  is	  completely	  absorbed	  into	  the	  
sovereignty	  of	  existing	  states.	  By	  reducing	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐determination	  of	  
peoples	  to	  the	  political	  and	  civil	  rights	  of	  individuals,	  the	  inference	  is	  made	  that	  even	  
decolonisation	  was	  a	  right	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  was	  instrumental	  in	  securing	  
individual	  political	  and	  civil	  rights.”46	  	  Remember,	  this	  idea	  was	  suggested	  by	  the	  
twin	  covenants.	  
By	  reducing	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  to	  “a	  right	  to	  be	  heard”	  (to	  
borrow	  Klabber’s	  words)	  it	  takes	  on	  a	  democratizing	  effect,	  too.	  	  Citing	  another,	  
Klabber	  sums	  up	  the	  current	  state	  of	  self-­‐determination	  nicely.	  
“Indeed,	  as	  Martti	  Koskenniemi	  has	  pointed	  out,	  there	  are	  essentially	  two	  
versions	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  competing	  with	  each	  other	  and	  eventually	  
lapsing	  into	  each	  other.	  There	  is	  a	  ‘good’	  version	  of	  self-­‐determination	  that	  
appeals	  to	  one's	  democratic	  instincts	  and	  sense	  of	  fairness,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  
less	  benign	  version	  which	  appeals	  to	  our	  nationalistic,	  isolationist,	  
exclusionary	  instincts.	  In	  the	  end,	  self-­‐determination	  ‘both	  supports	  and	  
challenges	  statehood,’	  and	  one	  is	  unable	  to	  consistently	  apply	  a	  right	  to	  self	  
determination	  precisely	  because	  one	  cannot	  distinguish,	  much	  less	  choose,	  
between	  the	  two.”47	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  189.	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  Batistich,	  1026.	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  188.	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Other	  authors	  describe	  this	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  “internal	  and	  external”	  
understandings	  of	  self-­‐determination.48	  
So	  then,	  today	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  broken	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  It	  
certainly	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  international	  law:	  its	  rhetoric	  is	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  
several	  key	  UN	  documents.	  	  It	  does	  exist	  and	  is	  important.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  broken	  in	  
that	  it	  seems	  to	  mean	  whatever	  it	  needs	  to	  mean	  in	  the	  moment.	  	  International	  law	  –	  
any	  law	  for	  that	  matter	  –	  can	  either	  be	  flexible	  or	  protect	  and	  defend	  rights:	  it	  
cannot	  be	  both.	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  many,	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  is	  not	  built	  into	  the	  right	  of	  
self-­‐determination.	  	  Rather,	  in	  the	  modern	  context,	  self-­‐determination	  has	  come	  to	  
mean	  democracy	  and	  representation.	  	  The	  value,	  at	  least	  for	  states	  playing	  politics,	  
is	  that	  by	  keeping	  self-­‐determination	  in	  limbo,	  they	  can	  more	  easily	  ignore	  a	  non-­‐
state’s	  claim	  to	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determine	  when	  necessary.49	  	  
Self-­Determination	  in	  the	  New	  Millennium	  
Peoples	  seeking	  independence	  have	  begun	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  this	  ambiguity	  of	  
self-­‐determination.	  	  The	  language	  of	  self-­‐determination	  seems	  to	  be	  used	  less	  and	  
less	  in	  conjunction	  with	  secession	  and	  independence.	  	  Kosovo	  provides	  a	  great	  
example.	  The	  writers	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  had	  clearly	  done	  
their	  homework.	  	  They	  seemed	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  
argument	  no	  longer	  held	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  and	  independence.	  	  The	  word,	  “self-­‐
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  Barelli,	  415;	  Maguire,	  27.	  
49	  Saul,	  612.	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determination,”	  appears	  nowhere	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.50	  	  
Nowhere.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Kosovo	  declaration	  does	  not	  even	  use	  any	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  
self-­‐determination.	  	  They	  do	  not	  justify	  their	  secession	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  a	  distinct	  
people	  and	  culture	  from	  Serbia	  or	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.51	  	  	  And,	  the	  
declaration	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  concentration	  of	  Kosovars	  in	  a	  distinct	  region	  of	  
Serbia.52	  	  The	  argument	  ignores	  all	  the	  key	  criteria	  previously	  necessary	  to	  build	  a	  
case	  for	  independence	  through	  self-­‐determination.	  	  Instead,	  the	  declaration	  talks	  
about	  how	  the	  disagreements	  between	  Serbia	  and	  Kosovo	  are	  unsolvable	  and	  
continued	  political	  union	  unworkable.53	  	  It	  is	  an	  argument	  based	  in	  pragmatism	  and	  
safety,	  not	  lofty	  language	  of	  rights	  and	  duties.	  	  	  
Predictably,	  Kosovo’s	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	  was	  
immediately	  challenged	  by	  Serbia	  and	  the	  ICJ	  was	  given	  another	  opportunity	  to	  rule	  
on	  matters	  of	  secession	  and	  independence,	  via	  a	  referral	  of	  this	  issue	  from	  the	  UN	  
General	  Assembly.	  	  When	  the	  ICJ	  finally	  returned	  a	  decision,	  the	  news	  media	  seemed	  
to	  hail	  it	  as	  a	  boon	  for	  peoples	  seeking	  independence	  everywhere.	  	  The	  media’s	  take	  
on	  the	  decision	  was	  that	  the	  ICJ	  had	  upheld	  Kosovo’s	  right	  to	  secede,	  unilaterally	  
from	  Serbia,	  potentially	  ending	  decades	  of	  war	  and	  conflict	  in	  the	  region.	  	  But	  did	  
they	  really?	  
The	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  had	  asked	  the	  ICJ	  for	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  question	  “Is	  
the	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	  by	  the	  Provisional	  Institutions	  of	  Self-­‐
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  Provisional	  Government	  of	  Kosovo,	  Kosovo	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  Pristina,	  
17	  February,	  2008.	  
51	  Kosovo	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	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  Kosovo	  Declaration	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  Independence.	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Government	  (PISG)	  of	  Kosovo	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  law?”54	  	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  the	  vagueness	  of	  this	  question,	  as	  several	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  
out.55	  	  One	  article	  lists	  10	  distinct	  ways	  to	  interpret	  that	  question,	  each	  on	  a	  very	  
different	  aspect	  of	  law	  and	  leading	  to	  a	  very	  different	  answer.56	  	  Some	  of	  these	  
possible	  options	  include,	  “Did	  international	  law	  confer	  upon	  Kosovo	  (or	  the	  people	  
thereof)	  a	  right	  to	  secede?	  Did	  international	  law	  require	  Kosovo	  to	  refrain	  from	  
seceding?	  …	  What	  was	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  the	  purported	  secession?	  Was	  it	  
successful?”57	  	  Above,	  we	  established	  that	  self-­‐determination	  clearly	  does	  not	  hold	  a	  
right	  to	  independence	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time.	  	  But,	  interpreting	  the	  question	  in	  any	  one	  
of	  these	  three	  ways	  would	  have	  given	  the	  ICJ	  an	  opportunity	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  legality	  of	  
secession	  and	  establish	  precedent.	  	  The	  ICJ	  had	  plenty	  of	  opportunity	  to	  determine	  
whether	  a	  non-­‐state	  has	  a	  right	  to	  secede	  under	  international	  law	  independent	  of	  
any	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  ICJ	  decided	  that	  the	  question	  did	  not	  
ask	  “whether	  or	  not	  the	  declaration	  has	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  State”	  and	  instead	  
decided	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  on	  its	  face:	  was	  the	  declaration	  illegal?	  –	  full	  stop.58	  	  
The	  ICJ,	  it	  seems,	  is	  comfortable	  with	  the	  current	  legal	  status	  of	  any	  right	  of	  
secession	  –	  or	  uncomfortable	  weighing	  in	  on	  such	  a	  potentially	  contentious	  issue.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  “Accordance	  with	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  
Unilateral	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  in	  Respect	  of	  Kosovo,”	  The	  Hague,	  22	  July	  
2010.	  
55	  John	  Cerone,	  “The	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  Kosovo’s	  
Independence,”	  ILSA	  Journal	  of	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  and	  Comparative	  Law	  17:2	  (2011);	  
Christian	  Pippan,	  “The	  International	  Court	  of	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  Advisory	  Opinion	  on	  Kosovo’s	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  of	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  and	  exercise	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  Europäisches	  Journal	  
für	  Minderheitenfragen	  3-­‐4:3	  (2010).	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  Cerone,	  342.	  
57	  Cerone,	  342.	  
58	  ICJ,	  424.	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   The	  ICJ	  decided	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  case	  that	  “state	  practice	  during	  this	  period	  
points	  clearly	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  international	  law	  contained	  no	  prohibition	  on	  
declarations	  of	  independence;”	  they	  cited	  centuries	  of	  declarations	  of	  independence	  
with	  no	  instance	  of	  anyone	  suggesting	  that	  such	  declarations	  were	  illegal	  under	  
international	  law.59	  	  Then,	  the	  ICJ	  decides	  not	  to	  answer	  whether	  the	  declaration	  
actually	  created	  a	  new	  state	  or	  not,	  suggesting	  that	  such	  a	  question	  was	  not	  part	  of	  
their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly’s	  request	  for	  an	  advisory	  opinion.60	  
	   Cerone	  sums	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  ICJ’s	  ruling	  up	  nicely:	  “the	  Opinion	  does	  not	  in	  
any	  way	  support	  Kosovo	  statehood.	  	  It	  merely	  cuts	  off	  one	  possible	  avenue	  for	  
arguing	  that	  the	  attempted	  secession	  is	  unlawful.”61	  	  The	  lingering	  effect	  of	  the	  
Kosovo	  decision	  then	  was	  not	  to	  clarify	  this	  burning	  question	  of	  whether	  non-­‐states	  
could	  legally	  gain	  real	  independence,	  but	  rather	  to	  ask	  whether	  they	  could	  legally	  
declare	  it:	  a	  difference	  of	  independence	  in	  practice	  verses	  independence	  in	  rhetoric.	  	  
The	  same	  author	  reduces	  this	  conclusion	  to	  the	  absurd	  and	  points	  out	  that,	  
according	  to	  the	  ICJ	  ruling,	  his	  mother	  is	  well	  within	  her	  international	  legal	  rights	  to	  
go	  on	  international	  TV	  and	  declare	  her	  living-­‐room	  a	  sovereign	  nation.62	  	  	  
	   At	  the	  end	  of	  it	  all,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  no	  right	  to	  secession,	  in	  international	  
law,	  for	  geographically	  contiguous	  non-­‐states	  seeking	  independence	  from	  another	  
nation.	  	  While	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  does	  still	  exist,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  
include	  secession	  anymore.	  	  While	  declaring	  independence	  is	  not	  illegal,	  and	  
achieving	  independence	  not	  impossible,	  independence	  is	  a	  political	  and	  military	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  ICJ,	  436.	  
60	  ICJ,	  437.	  
61	  Cerone,	  349.	  
62	  Cerone,	  335.	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matter,	  not	  a	  legal	  one.	  	  And,	  it	  seems	  doomed	  to	  stay	  that	  way	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  
future.	  
Concluding	  Thoughts	  on	  Independence	  in	  International	  Law	  
	   While	  international	  law	  has	  not	  developed	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  outside	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  empires	  and	  colonialization,	  I	  think	  there	  are	  still	  a	  couple	  
things	  in	  which	  a	  search	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  can	  take	  solace.	  
	  	   First,	  while	  there	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  any	  form,	  recent	  
experience	  does	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  international	  community	  supports	  
secession	  and	  independence	  outside	  of	  the	  empire/colonial	  experience	  in	  certain	  
extreme	  cases	  of	  injustice	  and	  violence	  –	  Kosovo	  and	  Bosnia	  for	  example.	  	  Indicating	  
that,	  while	  the	  international	  community	  does	  not	  recognize	  a	  legal	  right	  to	  
secession,	  it	  does	  seem	  that	  secession	  and	  independence	  are	  justified	  and	  within	  the	  
bounds	  of	  international	  law	  in	  certain	  extreme	  situations.	  	  Second,	  while	  there	  is	  
limited	  recognition	  of	  this,	  there	  was	  once	  an	  understanding	  that	  secession	  and	  
independence	  was	  necessary	  for	  a	  people	  to	  fully	  realize	  their	  “economic,	  social	  and	  
cultural	  development.”63	  	  	  
These	  two	  arguments	  form	  the	  foundation	  of	  what	  will	  be	  two	  separate	  
normative	  theories	  of	  secession,	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  Maybe,	  then,	  
the	  foundation	  has	  already	  been	  laid	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  international	  law.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  UN	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights;	  UN	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social,	  and	  
Cultural	  Rights.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Secession	  in	  Ethics	  and	  IR	  Theory	  
	   I	  began	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  secession	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  I	  
asked	  three	  questions.	  	  (1)	  What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  international	  
law?	  	  (2)	  What	  theories	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  have	  normative	  IR	  theorists	  
developed?	  	  (3)	  What	  should	  a	  path	  forward	  look	  like?	  	  	  
Thus	  far,	  I	  have	  answered	  the	  first	  one.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  international	  law	  at	  
once	  says	  much	  and	  little	  about	  secession.	  	  Over	  the	  last	  century,	  international	  law	  
has	  developed	  a	  path	  to	  secession	  and	  independence	  through	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐
determination,	  while	  being	  clear	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  path	  to	  independence	  found	  
in	  self-­‐determination	  is	  not	  universal.	  	  More	  recently,	  the	  courts	  –	  especially	  the	  ICJ	  
–	  have	  ruled	  with	  increasing	  adamancy	  that	  the	  universal	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  
means	  non-­‐states	  have	  a	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  government,	  thus	  democratizing	  self-­‐
determination	  and	  reinforcing	  the	  state	  system.	  	  But	  still,	  some	  states	  do	  achieve	  
independence	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  	  So	  then,	  the	  legal	  status	  
of	  independence	  movements	  and	  unilateral	  declarations	  of	  independence	  seems	  to	  
be	  handled	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  without	  any	  sort	  of	  go-­‐to	  rulings	  or	  language	  to	  
be	  found	  in	  broader	  international	  law.	  	  We	  further	  find	  that	  one	  recent	  secession	  
movement	  –	  Kosovo	  –	  completely	  eschewed	  self-­‐determination	  and	  instead	  chose	  to	  
make	  its	  case	  for	  independence	  based	  in	  pragmatism.	  	  
	   Clearly,	  international	  law	  has	  no	  single	  coherent	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  creating	  new	  
nations.	  	  But,	  the	  international	  legal	  system	  really	  cannot	  be	  blamed;	  this	  question	  is	  
not	  an	  easy	  one.	  	  It	  is	  one	  that	  pits	  the	  international	  system’s	  most	  central	  goal	  –	  
peace	  –	  against	  its	  most	  central	  principle	  –	  non-­‐intervention.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	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that	  will	  be	  easy	  to	  solve	  with	  consistency	  in	  the	  existing	  international	  system.	  	  This	  
is	  perhaps	  an	  easier	  issue	  for	  those	  interested	  in	  normative	  IR	  theory	  to	  resolve.	  	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  my	  second	  question	  and	  the	  question	  that	  will	  guide	  this	  chapter:	  
what	  theories	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  have	  normative	  IR	  theorists	  developed?	  	  
	   This	  chapter	  will	  seek	  to	  answer	  that	  question.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  my	  goal	  is	  to	  
delineate	  the	  categories	  and	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  the	  literature,	  analyzing	  and	  
comparing	  each	  grouping	  of	  scholars.	  	  It	  is	  not	  my	  goal	  to	  include	  everyone	  who	  has	  
written	  on	  the	  topic	  –	  such	  aspirations	  are	  unrealistic.	  	  Rather	  my	  goal	  is	  to	  explore	  
and	  categorize	  the	  main	  points	  of	  view	  while	  identifying	  the	  most	  significant	  
scholars	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  secession.	  
	   I	  have	  decided	  to	  begin	  with	  the	  most	  progressive	  set	  of	  theories,	  move	  
through	  the	  moderates,	  and	  finally	  into	  the	  most	  conservative:	  to	  go	  from	  left	  to	  
right	  on	  the	  ideological	  scale.	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  that,	  I	  first	  need	  to	  define	  what	  I	  mean	  
by	  progressive	  and	  conservative.	  	  Progressive	  theories	  are	  the	  one	  least	  like	  the	  
status	  quo.	  	  Progressive	  theories	  are	  most	  supportive	  of	  what	  they	  suggest	  is	  a	  
group’s	  right	  to	  secession,	  arguing	  that	  groups	  have	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  
secession	  and	  that	  secession	  is	  necessary	  for	  groups	  to	  flourish.	  
More	  conservative	  theories	  are	  more	  comfortable	  with	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  
Conservative	  theorists	  value	  the	  stability	  that	  the	  current	  state	  system	  offers.	  	  And,	  
while	  many	  recognize	  that	  secession	  may	  be	  necessary	  in	  certain	  cases,	  conservative	  
theorists	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  actually	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  deny	  
important	  minority	  groups	  the	  rights	  they	  enjoy	  under	  the	  current	  system.	  	  I	  have	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included	  a	  flow	  chart	  in	  the	  Appendix	  that	  illustrates	  the	  positions	  of	  each	  group	  and	  
their	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  groups.	  	  
	   One	  final	  note	  before	  I	  begin.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  unless	  the	  author	  uses	  the	  term,	  
I	  drop	  the	  term	  ‘self-­‐determination’	  since	  –	  as	  I	  established	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  
–	  that	  term	  no	  longer	  is	  equivalent	  to	  ‘independence’	  or	  ‘secession.’	  
Nationalist	  Theories64	  
	   A	  nationalist	  theory	  is	  any	  theory	  of	  secession	  that	  includes	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  at	  some	  basic	  level.	  	  A	  specific	  theory	  may	  place	  limitations	  on	  when	  and	  
who	  can	  secede	  –	  and	  indeed,	  most	  theories	  do.	  	  But,	  a	  nationalist	  theory	  allows	  for	  
a	  right	  to	  secession	  for	  all	  who	  meet	  the	  criteria	  the	  theory	  establishes.	  	  Within	  this	  
extremely	  broad	  category	  are	  two	  sub-­‐categories,	  differentiated	  by	  limits	  on	  when	  a	  
group	  can	  secede:	  remedial	  and	  primary	  right	  theories.65	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  my	  
promise	  to	  start	  with	  the	  most	  ideological	  progressive,	  we	  begin	  with	  primary	  right	  
to	  secession	  theories.	  
	   To	  further	  complicate	  things,	  primary	  right	  to	  secession	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  
into	  two	  final	  sub-­‐categories,	  differentiated	  by	  limits	  on	  who	  has	  a	  right	  to	  secede:	  
associative	  and	  ascriptive	  theories.	  	  Again,	  starting	  with	  the	  most	  progressive,	  I	  
begin	  with	  the	  associative	  primary	  right	  to	  secession	  theory,	  who	  believe	  that	  
secession	  should	  be	  open	  for	  any	  group	  at	  anytime.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  use	  a	  number	  of	  borrowed	  terms.	  	  The	  terms	  
“nationalist”	  and	  “statist”	  are	  borrowed	  from	  Doyle	  (2010)	  and	  the	  terms	  
“remedial,”	  “primary,”	  “associative,”	  and	  “ascriptive”	  are	  borrowed	  from	  Buchanan	  
(various).	  
65	  Alternately	  called	  “just	  cause”	  and	  “choice	  theory”	  respectively	  (Doyle	  2010).	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Harry	  Beran	  articulates	  one	  of	  the	  clearest	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  theory	  of	  
secession	  in	  a	  1984	  essay.66	  	  There,	  he	  argues	  that	  “secession	  [should]	  be	  permitted	  
if	  it	  is	  effectively	  desired	  by	  a	  territorial	  concentrated	  group	  within	  a	  state	  and	  is	  
morally	  and	  practically	  possible.”67	  	  While	  Beran	  does	  not	  conclusively	  delineate	  
what	  morally	  and	  practically	  possible	  mean,	  he	  does	  suggest	  that	  some	  important	  
limitations	  would	  be	  appropriate	  and	  in	  his	  concluding	  sections,	  suggests	  that	  future	  
research	  should	  discuss	  appropriate	  limits.68	  	  
	   Arguing	  from	  a	  philosophically	  liberal	  perspective,	  and	  with	  several	  nods	  to	  
Rousseau	  and	  Locke,	  Beran	  offers	  three	  principle	  justifications	  for	  his	  theory	  of	  
secession.	  	  First	  is	  freedom.	  	  In	  liberal	  society,	  people	  voluntarily	  enter	  into	  and	  
terminate	  all	  sorts	  of	  relationships	  based	  on	  rationality,	  why	  should	  a	  person’s	  
relationship	  with	  the	  state	  be	  any	  different?69	  	  Second	  is	  sovereignty.	  	  In	  liberal	  
democracies,	  the	  individual	  people	  are	  sovereign	  and	  the	  leaders	  derive	  their	  
sovereignty	  from	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  governed.	  	  Combine	  that	  understanding	  of	  
sovereignty	  with	  Beran’s	  assertion	  that	  there	  is	  a	  right	  to	  continue	  to	  occupy	  
traditional	  areas	  and	  “liberalism	  must	  also	  grant	  that	  territorially	  concentrated	  
groups	  can	  exercise	  their	  sovereignty…through	  secession.”70	  	  Beran’s	  third	  and	  final	  
argument	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  majority	  rule.	  	  If	  a	  minority	  is	  territorially	  concentrated,	  
it	  serves	  the	  principle	  of	  majority	  rule	  to	  release	  it	  from	  the	  host-­‐state.71	  	  “To	  permit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  I	  note	  the	  date	  here	  because	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Beran	  was	  writing	  before	  
the	  proliferation	  of	  essays	  on	  secession	  that	  surrounded	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  the	  USSR.	  
67	  Harry	  Beran,	  “A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Secession,”	  Political	  Studies	  XXXII	  (1984):	  23.	  
68	  Beran	  1984.	  
69	  Beran	  1984,	  25.	  
70	  Beran	  1984,	  25-­‐6	  
71	  Beran	  1984,	  27.	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secession	  only	  on	  moral	  grounds	  such	  as	  …	  right	  to	  national	  self-­‐determination,	  but	  
not	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  is	  deeply	  desired	  and	  pursued	  by	  adequate	  political	  action	  
seems	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  arguments	  from	  liberty,	  sovereignty	  and	  majority	  
rule.”72	  	  Here,	  Beran	  establishes	  himself	  in	  the	  associative	  primary	  theory	  camp.	  
	   Christopher	  Wellman	  is	  another	  scholar	  who	  is	  frequently	  referenced.	  	  Like	  
Beran,	  Wellman	  argues	  for	  an	  associative	  primary	  right	  to	  secession.73	  	  But,	  just	  as	  
Beran	  grounds	  his	  theory	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  ideology,	  Wellman	  grounds	  his	  
theory	  in	  a	  traditional	  (almost	  Wilsonian)	  reading	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐
determination.	  	  Wellman	  argues	  that	  self-­‐determination	  gives	  a	  non-­‐state	  territory	  
the	  right	  to	  independence.74	  	  He	  further	  argues	  what	  while	  a	  non-­‐state	  can	  use	  the	  
self-­‐determination	  argument	  to	  justify	  political	  divorce,	  the	  host	  state	  cannot	  use	  its	  
own	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  to	  coerce	  the	  non-­‐state	  to	  remain:	  self-­‐
determination	  only	  applies	  to	  gaining	  or	  maintaining	  independence,	  not	  to	  
preventing	  a	  non-­‐state	  from	  realizing	  independence.75	  	  He	  goes	  on,	  “the	  right	  to	  
political	  self-­‐determination	  is	  not	  absolute,	  but	  a	  group’s	  right	  to	  secede	  is	  
ordinarily	  outweighed	  only	  if	  the	  separatist	  group	  is	  either	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  
procure	  the	  benefits	  afforded	  by	  political	  society.”76	  	  Thus,	  cultural	  homogeneity	  
plays	  no	  role	  in	  a	  non-­‐state’s	  right	  to	  secession,	  for	  Wellman:	  “those	  nations	  whose	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Beran	  1984,	  28.	  
73	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Wellman	  describes	  himself	  as	  occupying	  a	  middle	  ground	  
between	  nationalist	  and	  statist	  schools.	  	  However	  this	  may	  be	  a	  rhetorical	  tool	  and	  
given	  the	  way	  I	  am	  describing	  the	  statist	  school	  he	  fits	  much	  more	  squarely	  where	  I	  
have	  put	  him.	  	  Allen	  Buchanan	  (1997)	  supports	  this	  categorization	  of	  Wellman.	  
74	  Christopher	  Wellman,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Secession,”	  in	  Secession	  As	  an	  International	  
Phenomenon,	  edited	  by	  Don	  Doyle	  (Athens,	  GA:	  The	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press,	  
2010).	  
75	  Wellman	  2010.	  
76	  Wellman	  2010,	  22.	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claims	  are	  legitimate	  will	  be	  justified	  by	  political	  capabilities,	  not	  by	  their	  cultural	  
attributes.”77	  	  
This	  general	  associative	  point	  of	  view	  seems	  extremely	  permissive,	  but	  as	  I	  
hinted,	  some	  significant	  limits	  do	  exist.	  	  First	  Beran’s	  theory	  is	  probably	  more	  
permissive	  than	  Wellman	  and	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  fear	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  secession	  
could	  lead	  to	  non-­‐states	  seceding	  on	  a	  whim;	  Beran	  dismisses	  this,	  arguing	  that	  
secession	  would	  still	  be	  difficult	  and	  the	  ramifications	  obvious	  and	  severe	  enough	  to	  
discourage	  secession	  without	  cause.78	  	  Beran	  includes	  a	  preliminary	  list	  of	  instances	  
when	  secession	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  or	  just.	  	  For	  example,	  secession	  should	  be	  
denied	  to	  a	  non-­‐state	  who	  would	  oppress	  a	  minority	  created	  by	  independence.79	  	  
Secession	  should	  also	  be	  denied	  to	  a	  non-­‐state	  that	  is	  too	  small	  to	  form	  a	  functional	  
state	  or	  a	  non-­‐state	  whose	  secession	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  
the	  host-­‐state.80	  	  Wellman	  similarly	  suggests	  some	  important	  limitations,	  but	  he	  
seems	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  non-­‐state’s	  ability	  to	  perform	  the	  functions	  
generally	  required	  of	  a	  state:	  “when	  a	  nation	  is	  sufficiently	  large,	  wealthy,	  politically	  
organized,	  and	  territorially	  contiguous,	  it	  can	  secede.”81	  
Essentially,	  any	  geographically	  contiguous	  non-­‐state	  group,	  whose	  departure	  
is	  fair	  and	  just	  for	  all	  involved	  has	  a	  right	  to	  secede	  for	  this	  group	  of	  perspectives.	  	  
This	  perspective	  may	  seem	  extreme,	  but	  has	  more	  followers	  than	  you	  might	  expect.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Wellman	  2010,	  23.	  (Emphasis	  Added)	  
78	  Beran	  1984,	  29-­‐30.	  
79	  Beran	  1984,	  30-­‐1.	  	  The	  fear	  Beran	  is	  addressing	  here	  is	  that	  members	  of	  the	  host	  
state’s	  majority	  ethnic	  group	  will	  find	  themselves	  minorities	  in	  the	  newly	  created	  
nation	  and	  could	  be	  victimized	  as	  an	  act	  of	  retribution.	  
80	  Beran	  1984,	  30-­‐1.	  
81	  Wellman	  2010,	  22.	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For	  example,	  this	  is	  the	  only	  argument	  that	  justifies	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  Republic	  
of	  Texas,	  meaning	  that	  anyone	  believing	  Texas	  has	  a	  right	  to	  secede	  holds	  this	  
perspective	  at	  some	  level.	  	  Similarly,	  this	  is	  generally	  the	  belief	  held	  by	  Southern	  
secessionists	  during	  the	  American	  Civil	  War.	  
The	  perspective’s	  progressiveness	  is	  also	  its	  greatest	  liability.	  	  The	  
international	  system	  is	  slow	  to	  adapt	  and	  skeptical	  of	  major	  changes.	  	  This	  would	  be	  
a	  major	  change.	  	  As	  Beran	  himself	  points	  out,	  minority	  group	  protection	  could	  also	  
be	  an	  issue.	  	  The	  other	  oft-­‐discussed	  potential	  issue	  with	  which	  this	  theory	  must	  
deal	  seriously	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  regression	  to	  the	  absurd:	  the	  fear	  that	  smaller	  and	  
smaller	  groups	  secede	  until	  a	  single	  city	  block,	  or	  even	  a	  single	  household,	  declares	  
itself	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  	  Each	  author	  develops	  unique	  ways	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  issue.	  	  
But	  if	  this	  theory	  were	  incorporated	  into	  international	  law,	  some	  rule	  would	  need	  to	  
be	  developed	  to	  address	  this	  problem,	  at	  least	  rhetorically.	  	  	  
However,	  this	  perspective	  appeals	  to	  many	  democratic	  impulses.	  	  Even	  
voting	  in	  the	  freest	  system	  possible	  comes	  with	  the	  limitations	  of	  that	  system.	  	  
Creating	  a	  new	  government	  however	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  government	  selection	  limited	  
only	  by	  what	  is	  conceivable:	  the	  ultimate	  exercise	  of	  political	  expression.	  	  And,	  
allowing	  any	  group	  to	  create	  a	  new	  government	  for	  themselves	  is	  the	  ultimate	  
expression	  of	  that	  ultimate	  political	  expression.	  
This	  theory	  has	  important	  practical	  strengths	  too.	  	  However,	  the	  practical	  
strengths	  do	  not	  make	  a	  whole	  lot	  of	  sense	  in	  the	  vacuum	  of	  looking	  at	  this	  single	  
perspective	  and	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  with	  some	  context.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  save	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  perspective’s	  strengths	  for	  the	  end	  of	  the	  next	  theory.	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   If	  associative	  theories	  of	  secession	  occupy	  the	  far	  left	  end	  of	  the	  ideological	  
continuum,	  ascriptive	  theories	  are	  just	  one	  notch	  in	  to	  the	  right.	  	  Associative	  and	  
ascriptive	  theories	  both	  fall	  into	  the	  broader	  heading	  of	  primary	  right	  to	  secession,	  
which	  means	  that	  both	  allow	  for	  secession	  at	  anytime,	  for	  any	  reason.	  	  However,	  
unlike	  associative	  theories,	  ascriptive	  theories	  limit	  that	  right	  to	  identifiable	  nations	  
with	  a	  shared	  history,	  culture,	  or	  other	  characteristics	  that	  might	  distinguish	  
nations:	  the	  group	  must	  constitute	  a	  national	  group.	  	  While	  fewer	  writers	  seem	  to	  
have	  planted	  their	  flag	  in	  this	  area	  of	  theory,	  it	  nonetheless	  warrants	  serious	  
discussion.82	  	  	  
	   Kofman	  wants	  to	  see	  a	  fairly	  permissive	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  but	  he	  
fears	  that	  the	  self-­‐imposed	  limits	  writers	  like	  Wellman	  and	  Beran	  suggest	  are	  
unrealistic.83	  	  Unlike	  theorists	  belonging	  to	  the	  associative	  school,	  who	  see	  secession	  
as	  a	  natural	  extension	  of	  basic	  political	  rights,	  Kofman	  sees	  the	  right	  to	  secession	  as	  
a	  way	  for	  minority	  ethnicities	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  their	  host-­‐nations.	  	  For	  
Kofman,	  the	  way	  state	  sovereignty	  works	  gives	  states	  a	  right	  to	  monopolize	  violence	  
to	  protect	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  state,	  which	  creates	  incentives	  to	  violently	  
put	  down	  any	  sort	  of	  nationalist	  uprising,	  effectively	  creating	  “anti-­‐secessionary	  
wars.”84	  	  But,	  establishing	  secession	  as	  a	  basic	  human	  right	  is	  too	  permissive;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  In	  his	  summary	  piece,	  Buchanan	  (1997)	  was	  only	  able	  to	  come	  up	  with	  one	  article.	  	  
It	  maybe	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  who	  articulate	  this	  position	  in	  a	  
secondary	  or	  implied	  way	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  other	  fields,	  notably	  studies	  of	  
nationalism.	  
83	  Kofman	  1998,	  31.	  
84	  Kofman	  1998,	  30-­‐1.	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instead,	  Kofman	  wants	  to	  create	  secession	  as	  a	  national	  right,	  mitigating	  the	  possible	  
chaos	  created	  by	  too	  many	  groups	  seceding	  too	  often.85	  	  	  
Kofman	  argues	  that	  theorists	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  too	  focused	  on	  power	  as	  a	  
motive	  for	  secession,	  he	  notes	  that	  some	  groups	  want	  independence	  despite	  the	  
obvious	  power	  costs.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  identity	  beyond	  power	  in	  the	  form	  of	  often	  
overlooked	  symbols	  are	  important	  considerations	  too.86	  	  He	  claims	  that	  states	  have	  
a	  several	  ways	  of	  creating	  a	  common	  national	  identity,	  from	  the	  mundane	  like	  
selecting	  the	  symbols	  that	  appear	  on	  currency,	  flags,	  seals,	  and	  the	  like,	  to	  making	  
decisions	  about	  appropriating	  and	  excluding	  cultural	  elements	  from	  a	  minority	  
group	  into	  the	  national	  cultural	  identity.87	  	  The	  reason	  non-­‐state	  national	  groups	  
want	  independence	  then	  is	  because	  “all	  groups	  live	  in	  a	  world	  of	  sovereign	  states,	  
and	  are	  affected	  by	  this	  world…if	  [they	  are]	  minorities,	  then	  they	  are	  necessarily	  
living	  in	  the	  orbit	  and	  political	  space	  dominated	  by	  another	  group.”88	  	  So	  then,	  the	  
right	  to	  secession	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  nationalistic	  group	  health	  and	  expression.	  	  
But,	  Kofman	  is	  clear,	  this	  right	  is	  “available	  only	  to	  certain	  groups	  having	  the	  
necessary	  prerequisites	  of	  common	  historical-­‐cultural	  identity	  and	  territory.”89	  
	   The	  most	  often	  cited	  and	  very	  carefully	  argued	  article	  for	  this	  perspective	  is	  
Margalit	  and	  Raz.	  	  They	  begin	  by	  establishing	  who,	  they	  believe,	  should	  have	  a	  right	  
to	  secession.	  	  They	  find	  groups	  with	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  secession	  must	  possess	  six	  
characteristics:	  (1)	  common	  character	  and	  culture,	  (2)	  practice	  of	  the	  culture	  makes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Kofman	  1998,	  31.	  
86	  Kofman	  1998.	  	  He	  is	  specifically	  interested	  in	  why	  Quebec	  (which	  he	  sees	  as	  one	  
of	  the	  most	  dominate	  forces	  in	  Canadian	  politics)	  is	  interested	  in	  independence.	  
87	  Kofman	  1998,	  32-­‐3.	  
88	  Kofman	  1998,	  34.	  
89	  Kofman	  1998,	  35.	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it	  pervasive,	  (3)	  membership	  is	  mutually	  recognized,	  (4)	  membership	  forms	  an	  
important	  part	  of	  one’s	  self-­‐identification,	  (5)	  membership	  is	  based	  on	  nonvoluntary	  
criteria,	  and	  (6)	  groups	  are	  big	  enough	  that	  membership	  must	  be	  based	  on	  shared	  
characteristics.90	  	  Here,	  Margalitz	  and	  Raz	  clearly	  lay	  out	  what	  constitutes	  a	  national	  
group.	  	  While	  their	  definition	  is	  significantly	  more	  thoroughly	  explored	  than	  the	  one	  
developed	  by	  Kofman,	  both	  would	  probably	  identify	  a	  very	  similar	  set	  of	  groups	  as	  
qualifying	  for	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  However,	  unlike	  Kofman,	  Margalitz	  and	  Raz	  seem	  
to	  suggest	  a	  slightly	  more	  conservative	  view	  of	  when	  a	  national	  group	  can	  secede.	  	  
Margalitz	  and	  Raz	  conclude,	  	  
“those	  who	  may	  benefit	  from	  self-­‐government	  cannot	  insist	  on	  it	  at	  all	  
costs.	  Their	  interests	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  along	  those	  of	  others.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  the	  interests	  of	  members	  of	  an	  encompassing	  group	  in	  
the	  self-­‐respect	  and	  prosperity	  of	  the	  group	  are	  among	  the	  most	  vital	  
human	  interests.	  Given	  their	  [group]	  importance,	  their	  satisfaction	  is	  
justified	  even	  at	  considerable	  cost	  to	  other	  interests.”91	  
	  	  
	   Seeing	  the	  potential	  dangers	  of	  the	  associative	  theories,	  ascriptive	  theorists	  
attempt	  to	  address	  those	  and	  other	  issues	  with	  a	  slightly	  more	  limited	  –	  though	  still	  
quite	  permissive	  –	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  Borrowing	  heavily	  from	  sociology	  and	  
anthropology,	  ascriptive	  theories	  seek	  to	  grant	  a	  very	  permissive	  right	  to	  secession	  
to	  national	  groups	  only.	  	  In	  the	  American	  context,	  Native	  Americans,	  Puerto	  Ricans,	  
and	  other	  distinct	  cultural	  groups	  would	  qualify	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  under	  for	  
this	  perspective,	  but	  Texas	  probably	  would	  not	  since	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  distinct	  
enough	  culture.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Avishai	  Margalit	  and	  Joseph	  Raz,	  “National	  Self-­‐Determination,”	  Journal	  of	  
Philosophy	  LXXXVII,	  no.	  9	  (September	  1990):	  443-­‐7.	  
91	  Margalitz	  and	  Raz	  1990,	  461.	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   The	  great	  strength	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  address	  the	  
‘regression	  to	  the	  absurd’	  problem	  that	  associative	  theories	  had.	  	  Arguing	  that	  only	  
identifiable	  peoples	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  preempts	  the	  suburban	  cul-­‐de-­‐sac	  that	  
wants	  to	  declare	  its	  status	  as	  a	  sovereign	  nation.	  
	   I	  can	  now	  return	  to	  one	  more	  strength	  of	  associative	  theory	  (a	  right	  to	  
secession	  unlimited	  by	  national	  identities).	  	  By	  ignoring	  nationality,	  associative	  
perspectives	  are,	  perversely,	  probably	  best	  at	  preserving	  national	  identities.	  	  
Perspectives	  that	  only	  allow	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  for	  national	  groups	  could	  have	  two	  
unintended	  consequences.	  	  First,	  a	  host	  state	  could	  simply	  deny	  that	  a	  non-­‐state	  
group	  seeking	  secession	  meets	  the	  criteria	  for	  a	  national	  group.	  	  Second,	  in	  an	  effort	  
to	  prevent	  future	  secession,	  the	  host	  state	  may	  find	  subtle	  ways	  of	  undermining	  the	  
nationalistic	  identity,	  resulting	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  identity	  the	  other	  theories	  
seek	  to	  preserve.	  	  
Remedial	  Right	  to	  Secession92	  	  	  
	   If	  there	  is	  a	  middle	  ground	  in	  this	  discussion	  between	  the	  permissive	  primary	  
right	  theories	  explored	  above	  and	  the	  restrictive	  statist	  theories	  explored	  
momentarily,	  it	  is	  the	  remedial	  right	  theories.	  	  Remedial	  right	  theorists	  argue	  that	  
non-­‐states	  can	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secession,	  but	  only	  if	  they	  have	  suffered	  some	  sort	  of	  
injustice	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  host	  state.	  	  There	  are	  some	  interesting	  parallels	  to	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  protect.	  	  Essentially,	  a	  non-­‐state	  only	  gains	  access	  to	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  if	  the	  host-­‐state	  forfeits	  it.	  	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  I	  suggested	  
that	  the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐state	  secession	  potentially	  pits	  the	  international	  system’s	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  This	  category	  of	  theories	  has	  alternately	  been	  called	  “just	  cause	  theory	  (Doyle	  
2010).”	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central	  goal	  –	  peace	  –	  against	  its	  most	  central	  principle	  –	  non-­‐intervention.	  	  It	  seems	  
this	  perspective	  tries	  to	  achieve	  both	  ends.	  
	   Allen	  Buchanan,	  a	  long-­‐serving	  anchor	  of	  right	  to	  secession	  theory	  falls	  
squarely	  into	  this	  category.	  	  Buchanan	  rejects	  primary-­‐associative	  rights	  theories,	  
raising	  another	  concern:	  without	  a	  national	  connection	  to	  the	  territory,	  a	  non-­‐
national	  group	  of	  people	  simply	  lack	  a	  claim	  more	  convincing	  than	  the	  host-­‐state.93	  	  
He	  also	  finds	  the	  primary-­‐ascriptive	  argument	  unconvincing,	  this	  time	  arguing	  that	  
there	  are	  too	  many	  possible	  nations	  on	  earth	  for	  each	  of	  them	  to	  form	  a	  viable	  
political	  community.94	  
	   What	  is	  more	  satisfying	  for	  Buchanan,	  is	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  based	  on	  justice	  
(as	  opposed	  to	  liberal	  political	  philosophy	  or	  nationhood).	  	  In	  his	  1991	  article,	  
Buchanan	  raises	  three	  possible	  justifications.	  	  First,	  a	  non-­‐state	  has	  a	  just	  claim	  to	  
seceded	  if	  their	  land	  was	  conquered	  unjustly.95	  	  Similarly,	  a	  non-­‐state	  has	  a	  just	  
cause	  for	  secession	  if	  they	  are	  systemically	  disadvantaged	  economically	  by	  the	  host-­‐
state.96	  	  And	  finally,	  if	  the	  continued	  existence	  of	  the	  group	  requires	  they	  secede:	  for	  
example,	  due	  to	  genocide	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing.97	  
Michel	  Seymour	  provides	  a	  more	  recent	  exploration	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  His	  
contribution	  to	  remedial	  right	  theory	  is	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  primary	  right	  to	  internal	  
self-­‐determination.	  	  “Minority	  nations	  do	  not	  have	  a	  primary	  right	  to	  external	  self-­‐
determination.	  They	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secede	  only	  if	  the	  encompassing	  state	  fails	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Allen	  Buchanan,	  “Toward	  a	  Theory	  of	  Secession,”	  Ethics	  101,	  no.	  2	  (January	  1991):	  
328.	  
94	  Buchanan	  1991,	  329.	  
95	  Buchanan	  1991,	  329.	  
96	  Buchanan	  1991,	  330-­‐1.	  
97	  Buchanan	  1991,	  331.	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grant	  them	  internal	  self-­‐determination,	  or	  if	  other	  remedial	  conditions	  apply,	  such	  
as	  those	  mentioned	  by	  Buchanan.”98	  	  	  
	   Evan	  Brewer’s	  theory	  of	  secession	  is	  also	  in	  this	  remedial	  framework	  and	  one	  
of	  the	  few	  developed	  after	  the	  ICJ’s	  ruling	  on	  Kosovo.	  	  Brewer	  sees	  an	  opening	  in,	  
and	  builds	  his	  theory	  on,	  the	  dissenting	  opinion	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  case	  by	  ICJ	  judge	  
Cancado	  Trindade.	  	  	  The	  theory	  Brewer	  develops	  includes	  five	  criteria.	  	  “A	  group	  
should	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secede…where	  it	  (1)	  constitutes	  a	  ‘people,’	  (2)	  is	  governed	  
unequally	  or	  subjected	  to	  systematic	  oppression	  or	  egregious	  violations	  of	  human	  or	  
humanitarian	  rights,	  (3)	  is	  denied	  any	  internal	  realization	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  (4)	  
freely	  chooses	  to	  exercise	  self-­‐determination	  externally,	  and	  (5)	  respects	  jus	  cogens	  
norms	  and	  rights	  of	  other	  minorities	  and	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  ensure	  such	  respect	  in	  
the	  future.”99	  	  	  
A	  couple	  things	  are	  worth	  noting	  from	  his	  point-­‐by-­‐point	  exploration	  of	  this	  
theory.	  	  The	  continued	  reference	  to	  self-­‐determination	  is	  very	  interesting.	  	  He	  at	  
once	  recognizes	  that	  self-­‐determination	  does	  not	  mean	  secession	  or	  independence,	  
but	  simultaneously	  tries	  to	  couch	  his	  theory	  in	  the	  same	  terms.100	  	  Second,	  Brewer	  
notes	  that	  “systemic…violations	  of	  human	  or	  humanitarian	  rights,”	  could	  include	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Michel	  Seymour,	  “Secession	  as	  a	  Remedial	  Right,”	  Inquiry:	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  
Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  50	  no.	  4	  (August	  2007):	  411.	  
99	  Evan	  M.	  Brewer,	  “To	  Break	  Free	  from	  Tyranny	  and	  Oppression:	  Proposing	  a	  
Model	  for	  a	  Remedial	  Right	  to	  Secession	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  Advisory	  
Opinion,”	  Vanderbilt	  Journal	  of	  Transnational	  Law	  45	  no.	  1	  (January	  2012):	  276.	  	  I	  
find	  his	  continued	  use	  of	  ‘self-­‐determination’	  as	  a	  basis	  interesting	  given	  the	  recent	  
rulings	  of	  various	  international	  courts.	  
100	  Brewer	  (2012)	  recognizes	  that	  self-­‐determination	  is	  universal	  but	  not	  equal	  to	  
independence	  in	  on	  pages	  256-­‐60.	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“state	  action,	  the	  state’s	  deliberate	  failure	  to	  act,	  or	  action	  by	  state	  proxy.”101	  	  What	  
is	  interesting	  here	  is	  the	  echo	  of	  language	  found	  in	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect.	  	  
Here	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  is	  expanded	  to	  include	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  state	  to	  
completely	  and	  permanently	  lose	  sovereignty	  over	  a	  territory,	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  live	  up	  to	  
the	  responsibilities	  sovereignty	  implies.	  	  Third,	  since	  self-­‐determination	  really	  
means	  in	  international	  law	  now	  was	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  right	  to	  have	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  
government;	  Brewer’s	  third	  criterion	  solidifies	  and	  provides	  for	  a	  punishment	  
should	  a	  host-­‐state	  fail	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  “right	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously.”102	  	  And,	  it	  is	  
largely	  similar	  to	  Seymour’s	  “primary	  right	  to	  internal	  self-­‐determination.”103	  	  
Finally,	  for	  Brewer	  failure	  to	  respect	  minority	  rights	  is	  enough	  to	  void	  a	  non-­‐state’s	  
right	  to	  secession	  even	  if	  all	  other	  conditions	  have	  been	  met.104	  
Perhaps	  owing	  to	  this	  occupation	  of	  the	  middle	  ground,	  there	  is	  some	  debate	  
about	  where	  the	  remedial	  right	  theorists	  fit	  into	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  larger	  debate.	  	  
Some	  try	  to	  group	  remedial	  right	  theories	  in	  with	  statist	  theories.	  	  However,	  I	  think	  
the	  difference	  between	  creating	  an	  automatic	  and	  universal	  right	  to	  secession	  after	  
cases	  of	  injustice	  is	  importantly	  distinct	  from	  the	  statist	  perspective	  that	  only	  
recognizes	  secession	  on	  an	  individual	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	  I	  argue	  that,	  any	  theory	  
that	  creates	  a	  general	  right	  to	  secession,	  regardless	  of	  limitations,	  belongs	  in	  the	  
nationalist	  camp.	  
It	  may	  seem	  obvious	  that	  a	  non-­‐state	  group	  victimized	  by	  the	  host	  state	  
should	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  Interestingly,	  however,	  creating	  a	  remedial	  right	  to	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  Brewer	  2012,	  276	  &	  281.	  
102	  Klabbers	  
103	  Seymour	  2007,	  420.	  
104	  Brewer	  2012,	  285.	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secession	  in	  international	  law	  would	  open	  secession	  to	  a	  few	  groups	  who	  currently	  
do	  not	  have	  it.	  	  If	  we	  allow	  non-­‐states	  who	  have	  been	  victims	  of	  genocide	  to	  secede,	  
a	  right	  to	  secession	  opens	  for	  Darfur	  in	  Sudan	  and	  the	  Tutsis	  of	  Rwanda.	  	  If	  we	  
include	  lands	  unjustly	  taken,	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  must	  also	  open	  for	  Tibet.	  
The	  remedial	  nature	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  probably	  
makes	  it	  more	  palatable	  to	  the	  current	  state	  system.	  	  Just	  as	  most	  Western	  societies	  
remove	  children	  from	  abusive	  parents,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  find	  agreement	  –	  at	  least	  among	  
the	  Western	  powers	  –	  that	  we	  should	  remove	  non-­‐states	  from	  abusive	  host	  states.	  	  
This	  perspective	  is	  also	  more	  palatable	  for	  the	  current	  system	  because	  it	  preserves	  
the	  current	  system	  for	  states	  that	  are	  just.	  
However,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  here	  too.	  	  First,	  the	  international	  
community	  is	  already	  sufficiently	  incentivized	  to	  avoid	  applying	  labels	  like	  
“genocide”	  and	  “ethnic	  cleansing”	  to	  crises.	  	  Adding	  an	  explicit	  right	  to	  secession	  to	  
those	  labels	  could	  mean	  a	  total	  elimination	  of	  ‘genocide’	  and	  ‘ethnic	  cleansing’	  as	  
global	  problem	  that	  states	  recognize.	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  disconcerting	  that	  activation	  of	  
the	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  remedial	  theories	  requires	  death,	  suffering,	  and	  acts	  of	  
violence.	  	  It	  seems	  borderline	  hypocritical:	  why	  should	  a	  right	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  
death	  and	  violence	  against	  minorities	  require	  death	  and	  violence	  against	  the	  same	  
minorities	  to	  activate?	  	  By	  the	  time	  we	  get	  to	  that	  point,	  the	  situation	  has	  escalated	  
to	  a	  point	  from	  which	  it	  is	  incredibly	  difficult	  to	  return.	  Third,	  the	  obvious	  question	  –	  
what	  types	  of	  injustice	  and	  what	  are	  the	  relevant	  thresholds	  –	  are	  not	  really	  
addressed	  in	  serious	  detail	  in	  any	  of	  the	  remedial	  rights	  literature	  I	  read.	  	  Fourth	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and	  finally,	  it	  is	  theoretically	  possible	  to	  provoke	  acts	  of	  egregious	  injustice	  against	  
yourself,	  especially	  if	  the	  threshold	  is	  set	  low.105	  
The	  addition	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  for	  non-­‐states	  whose	  land	  was	  
inappropriately	  appropriated	  is	  also	  problematic.	  	  First,	  when	  does	  a	  claim	  that	  land	  
unjustly	  taken	  justifies	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  expire?	  	  Do	  the	  Cherokee	  still	  have	  a	  right	  
to	  reclaim	  their	  traditional	  homelands	  on	  the	  eastern	  seaboard	  and	  form	  an	  
independent	  state,	  displacing	  millions	  of	  people	  who	  have	  lived	  there	  for	  
generations?	  	  Second,	  inclusion	  of	  lands	  unjustly	  taken	  is	  problematic	  because	  many	  
nations	  who	  take	  lands	  believe	  they	  have	  an	  historic	  or	  cultural	  right	  to	  the	  lands	  in	  
question.	  	  For	  example,	  Palestinians	  could	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  unjustly	  forced	  off	  
their	  land	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  Israelis	  could	  counter	  that	  they	  have	  a	  
cultural	  and	  historic	  right	  to	  same	  land.	  	  
Statist	  
	   Statists	  worry	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  establishing	  a	  permanent,	  universal	  right	  
to	  secession.	  	  They	  raise	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  
“host	  state”	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  host	  state	  and	  its	  people.	  	  However,	  statists	  also	  
recognize	  that	  “no”	  is	  not	  a	  satisfying	  response	  to	  secession	  movements	  and	  statists	  
tend	  to	  suggest	  that	  host	  states	  try	  to	  democratize	  and	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  give	  voice	  –	  
and	  perhaps	  some	  limited	  autonomy	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  existing	  state	  –	  to	  the	  
non-­‐state	  groups.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  to	  suggest	  that	  statists	  emphatically	  
deny	  that	  secession	  is	  sometimes	  justified,	  such	  a	  claim	  would	  grossly	  misrepresent	  
the	  perspective.	  	  Rather	  statists	  do	  not	  want	  to	  see	  the	  creation	  of	  any	  sort	  of	  right	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to	  secession	  that	  is	  not	  case-­‐specific:	  that	  is,	  while	  the	  secession	  of	  a	  non-­‐state	  is	  
sometimes	  just	  and	  unavoidable,	  the	  international	  system	  should	  not	  reform	  to	  
incorporate	  an	  automatic	  and	  universal	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  As	  a	  point	  of	  reference,	  
the	  statist	  perspective	  is	  broadly	  the	  perspective	  that	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  ICJ	  
and	  other	  international	  courts	  and	  is	  generally	  the	  policy	  of	  states	  themselves.106	  	  	  
Aside	  from	  the	  obvious	  ‘maintenance	  of	  territorial	  integrity’	  argument,	  other	  
arguments	  are	  also	  available.	  	  Statists,	  raise	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  to	  respond	  to	  
nationalists’	  calls	  for	  broader	  rights	  to	  secede.	  	  Here,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  identify	  just	  a	  
couple	  of	  the	  most	  compelling	  ones.	  
	   The	  first	  is	  well	  summarized	  by	  Jan	  Klabbers.	  	  While	  he	  is	  primarily	  
concerned	  with	  the	  status	  and	  evolution	  of	  self-­‐determination	  in	  international	  law,	  
he	  is	  speaking	  largely	  of	  a	  self-­‐determination	  that	  has	  historically	  been	  tied	  to	  
secession.	  	  He	  highlights	  an	  important	  issue	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  piece.	  	  “Self-­‐
determination	  has	  always	  been	  plagued	  by	  the	  problem	  that	  a	  decision	  in	  favor	  of	  
the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  [by	  the	  courts]	  (where	  this	  would	  imply	  secession,	  at	  
any	  rate)	  of	  one	  group	  automatically	  entails	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  same	  right	  to	  another	  
group.”107	  	  That	  is,	  by	  granting	  sovereignty	  to	  a	  non-­‐state,	  you	  necessarily	  restrict	  
the	  host	  state’s	  right	  to	  sovereignty,	  a	  key	  part	  of	  their	  statehood.	  	  	  
Ultimately,	  Klabbers	  envisions	  self-­‐determination	  ceasing	  to	  mean	  something	  
akin	  to	  secession	  and	  instead	  coming	  to	  mean	  something	  like	  ‘political	  
representation.’	  	  If	  all	  non-­‐state	  groups	  have	  political	  representation,	  there	  will	  be	  
no	  need	  –	  in	  Klabbers’s	  assessment	  –	  for	  a	  full	  right	  to	  secession	  and	  independence.	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What	  these	  non-­‐states	  really	  want	  is	  political	  voice,	  and	  currently	  they	  feel	  that	  the	  
only	  way	  to	  achieve	  that	  is	  through	  independence.	  
	   In	  an	  article	  for	  the	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  Donald	  Horowitz	  offers	  several	  
important	  cautions	  indicative	  of	  the	  statist	  perspective.	  	  First,	  he	  reiterates	  a	  point	  
made	  throughout	  the	  literature,	  that	  secession	  does	  not	  necessarily	  create	  a	  single	  
unified	  nation-­‐state.	  	  Like	  several	  other	  theorists,	  Horowitz	  worries	  about	  minority	  
protection	  in	  the	  new	  state,	  especially	  members	  of	  the	  majority	  national	  group	  in	  
the	  host-­‐state	  who	  are	  now	  minorities	  in	  the	  new	  state.	  	  Horowitz	  is	  less	  optimistic	  
that	  minority	  protections	  can	  be	  guaranteed	  and	  points	  out	  the	  very	  real	  possibility	  
of	  retributive	  actions.108	  	  
	   Second,	  Horowitz	  also	  points	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  old	  tensions	  will	  not	  
go	  away	  after	  secession	  and	  independence,	  making	  what	  was	  formerly	  an	  intrastate	  
conflict	  into	  an	  interstate	  conflict.109	  	  If	  intrastate	  conflicts	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  
destabilize	  a	  region,	  interstate	  conflicts	  have	  even	  greater	  potential	  to	  further	  
destabilize	  a	  region.	  
	   Finally,	  Horowitz	  rejects	  remedial	  theories	  explicitly.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  creating	  
an	  automatic	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  the	  case	  of	  injustice	  will	  only	  create	  more	  
injustice,	  not	  prevent	  future	  injustice:	  “If	  independence	  can	  only	  be	  won	  legitimately	  
after	  matters	  have	  been	  carried	  to	  extremes,	  then,	  by	  all	  means,	  there	  are	  people	  
willing	  to	  carry	  them	  to	  extremes.”110	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  Horowitz	  is	  not	  suggesting	  
secession	  is	  never	  justified:	  “in	  those	  rare	  cases	  in	  which	  separation	  of	  antagonists	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is,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  the	  best	  course,	  partition	  can	  be	  accomplished	  
reluctantly…without	  recognizing	  a	  right	  to	  secede.”111	  	  Rather,	  he	  –	  summing	  up	  the	  
statist	  perspective	  nicely	  –	  fears	  the	  consequences	  of	  making	  secession	  an	  automatic	  
and	  universal	  right	  in	  any	  situation.	  
	   Unlike	  the	  other	  perspectives,	  statist	  theories	  do	  not	  add	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  
and	  thus	  no	  non-­‐state	  groups	  gain	  a	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  However,	  statist	  
perspectives	  do	  offer	  some	  advantages	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  theories.	  	  First,	  if	  statist	  
theory	  (especially	  Klabber’s	  ‘right	  to	  be	  heard’)	  is	  applied	  fully,	  it	  could	  have	  a	  
democratizing	  effect	  on	  the	  world	  as	  states	  are	  forced	  to	  democratize	  in	  order	  for	  
their	  minorities	  to	  more	  fully	  realize	  their	  right	  to	  internal	  self-­‐determination.	  	  If	  
non-­‐states	  were	  allowed	  a	  right	  to	  leave,	  the	  host	  state	  would	  not	  democratize	  and	  
its	  own	  citizen	  would	  get	  no	  benefit	  out	  of	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  group.	  	  
Second,	  in	  the	  primary	  right	  theories	  especially,	  non-­‐states	  who	  choose	  to	  remain	  
attached	  to	  the	  host	  state	  acquire	  a	  lot	  of	  power	  over	  the	  host	  state.	  	  If	  the	  host	  state	  
wants	  to	  hang	  onto	  the	  non-­‐state	  group	  (and	  in	  many	  cases	  they	  would)	  it	  would	  be	  
possible	  for	  the	  non-­‐state	  to	  leverage	  that	  desire	  into	  undue	  power	  over	  the	  host	  
state.	  	  Resulting	  in	  a	  tyranny	  of	  the	  minority	  and	  effectively	  eliminating	  any	  
democratizing	  effect.	  	  Finally,	  the	  statist	  perspective	  does	  not	  require	  any	  additions,	  
reinterpreting,	  or	  rewriting	  of	  international	  law.	  
	   However,	  the	  statist	  perspective	  leaves	  the	  issues	  I	  began	  with	  largely	  
unaddressed.	  	  Groups	  seeking	  independence,	  sovereignty,	  and	  statehood	  are	  still	  left	  
with	  only	  a	  few	  ways	  to	  achieve	  that	  goal,	  many	  with	  very	  negative	  consequences.	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And,	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  international	  system	  to	  determine	  who	  is	  afforded	  statehood	  
and	  who	  is	  not,	  statists	  effectively	  leave	  the	  decision	  up	  to	  a	  few	  great	  powers.	  
	  Conclusion	  
	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  answer	  the	  second	  of	  my	  three	  questions:	  what	  
theories	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  have	  normative	  IR	  theorists	  developed?	  	  Essentially,	  I	  
have	  found	  four	  separate	  and	  distinct	  categories	  of	  perspectives.	  	  First,	  are	  the	  
associative	  primary	  right	  to	  secession	  theories.	  	  These	  theorists	  argue	  that	  there	  
needs	  to	  be	  a	  universal	  right	  to	  secession	  that	  is	  not	  predicated	  on	  suffering	  
previous	  injustice,	  or	  even	  constituting	  a	  minority	  ethnic	  group	  distinct	  from	  the	  
majority	  ethnic	  group	  of	  the	  host	  state.	  	  A	  group	  of	  people,	  being	  reasonably	  large,	  
should	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secede	  at	  any	  time	  for	  any	  reason	  because	  people	  have	  a	  basic	  
right	  to	  establish	  (determine)	  their	  government	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  give	  it	  authority.	  
	   Next,	  I	  looked	  at	  ascriptive	  primary	  right	  theories.	  	  They	  agree	  that	  there	  
needs	  to	  be	  a	  universal	  right	  to	  secession	  that	  is	  not	  predicated	  on	  suffering	  
previous	  injustice.	  	  However,	  these	  theorists	  break	  with	  associative	  theorists	  and	  
argue	  that	  the	  non-­‐state	  group	  at	  least	  should	  constitute	  an	  ethno-­‐nationalistic	  
group	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  majority	  ethno-­‐nationalistic	  group	  of	  the	  host	  state.	  	  A	  
group	  of	  people,	  being	  reasonably	  large	  and	  sharing	  a	  common	  identity,	  should	  have	  
a	  right	  to	  secede	  at	  any	  time	  for	  any	  reason	  because	  such	  a	  right	  (even	  if	  
unpracticed)	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  preserving	  and	  cementing	  national	  identity.	  
	   Third,	  I	  looked	  at	  remedial	  right	  theorists.	  	  They	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  universal	  
right	  to	  secession	  that	  is	  not	  predicated	  on	  the	  host	  state	  forfeiting	  their	  claim	  to	  the	  
non-­‐state’s	  territory	  through	  unjust	  actions.	  	  For	  remedial	  right	  theories	  a	  group	  of	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people,	  having	  earned	  a	  right	  to	  independence	  through	  the	  forfeiture	  (through	  some	  
form	  of	  gross	  injustice)	  of	  the	  host	  state’s	  authority	  over	  them,	  should	  have	  a	  right	  
to	  secede	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  group’s	  ultimate	  preservation	  and	  continued	  existence.	  
	   Finally,	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  statist	  perspective.	  	  Statists	  reject	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  
a	  need	  for	  any	  sort	  or	  right	  to	  secession	  –	  primary,	  remedial,	  or	  otherwise.	  	  They	  
argue	  that	  creating	  such	  a	  right	  is	  dangerous	  and	  the	  international	  community	  
should	  only	  grant	  independence	  sparingly	  and	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	  While	  
secession	  may	  be	  just	  and	  necessary,	  creating	  a	  right	  to	  it	  is	  unfair	  and	  dangerous.	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Chapter	  4	  –	  Toward	  a	  Solution	  
	   This	  thesis	  has	  been	  a	  search	  for	  a	  right	  to	  secession.	  	  I	  began	  by	  setting	  up	  
modern	  secession	  in	  the	  histories	  of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  and	  American	  Civil	  
War.	  	  I	  noted	  the	  hypocrisy	  of	  arguing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  secession	  
in	  one	  case	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  	  Extrapolating	  from	  there,	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  
hypocrisy	  is	  still	  around	  today.	  	  Referencing	  civil	  war,	  genocide,	  refugees,	  
humanitarian	  interventions,	  and	  the	  struggle,	  loss	  of	  life,	  and	  violence	  that	  often	  
results	  from	  secessionary	  struggles,	  I	  made	  the	  case	  that	  this	  is	  an	  international	  
issue.	  
	   In	  the	  second	  chapter,	  I	  asked	  what	  the	  status	  of	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  
international	  law	  was.	  	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  even	  though	  much	  international	  law	  is	  only	  
concerned	  with	  state	  interaction,	  some	  extant	  international	  law	  does	  deal	  with	  
state/citizen	  interaction	  and	  some	  more	  recent	  developments	  have	  changed	  the	  
nature	  of	  international	  legal	  personhood	  to	  include	  individuals.	  	  I	  reminded	  the	  
reader	  of	  the	  potential	  consequences	  of	  a	  people’s	  search	  for	  independence	  and	  
pointed	  out	  that	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  ways	  a	  state	  can	  acquire	  
independence	  in	  international	  law.	  	  Then,	  after	  defining	  self-­‐determination	  as	  the	  
idea	  that	  people	  should	  be	  able	  to	  ‘determine’	  their	  government	  and	  differentiating	  
‘internal’	  and	  ‘external’	  self-­‐determination,	  I	  explored	  the	  history	  and	  evolution	  of	  
self-­‐determination	  in	  international	  law.	  	  	  
I	  began	  after	  World	  War	  One	  where	  self-­‐determination	  was	  used	  rhetorically	  
to	  break-­‐up	  the	  Ottoman	  and	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empires.	  	  I	  explored	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
self-­‐determination	  in	  UN	  documents	  following	  World	  War	  Two	  and	  I	  explained	  how	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the	  idea	  of	  self-­‐determination	  was	  used	  to	  free	  the	  colonies	  and	  create	  new	  nations	  
all	  over	  the	  world.	  	  Next,	  I	  looked	  at	  self-­‐determination	  in	  the	  post	  colonial	  era	  and	  
argued	  that	  recent	  rulings	  by	  various	  international	  courts	  has,	  once	  more	  
reconceptualized	  self-­‐determination,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  right	  to	  independence	  for	  a	  
specific	  group.	  	  Rather,	  in	  the	  modern	  context	  self-­‐determination	  is	  more	  limited	  to	  
its	  internal	  definition:	  a	  right	  of	  a	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  political	  process	  of	  
their	  host	  state.	  	  I	  illustrated	  that	  point	  with	  the	  Kosovo	  declaration	  of	  
independence,	  which	  does	  not	  use	  arguments	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  self-­‐
determination.	  	  Finally,	  I	  noticed	  two	  international	  law	  contributions	  to	  normative	  
IR	  theory:	  special	  cases	  do	  still	  merit	  secession	  and	  independence	  and	  the	  rhetoric	  
of	  the	  UN	  suggests	  that	  independence	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  culture	  to	  truly	  realize	  their	  
economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  potential.	  
In	  my	  third	  chapter,	  I	  tried	  to	  answer	  the	  question,	  what	  theories	  of	  a	  right	  to	  
secession	  have	  normative	  international	  relations	  theorists	  developed.	  	  I	  began	  with	  
the	  most	  permissive	  theories.	  	  Associative	  primary	  right	  theories	  argue	  that	  any	  
non-­‐state	  group	  should	  have	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  at	  any	  time	  and	  for	  any	  reason	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  members	  share	  an	  ethno-­‐national	  identity,	  arguing	  the	  
right	  to	  choose	  your	  government	  is	  a	  basic	  right.	  	  Ascriptive	  primary	  right	  theorists	  
also	  argue	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  universal	  right	  to	  secession	  at	  any	  time	  and	  for	  any	  
reason	  but	  limit	  that	  right	  to	  established	  ethno-­‐national	  groups,	  arguing	  that	  the	  
right	  to	  independence	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  flourishing	  for	  an	  ethno-­‐national	  
group.	  	  Remedial	  right	  theorists	  argue	  that	  there	  should	  be	  an	  automatic	  right	  to	  
secession	  but	  that	  the	  right	  to	  secession	  should	  only	  activate	  if	  the	  non-­‐state	  group	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has	  suffered	  some	  sort	  of	  egregious	  human	  rights	  violation,	  arguing	  that	  just	  states’	  
right	  to	  sovereignty	  and	  territorial	  integrity	  should	  not	  be	  broken	  on	  a	  whim.	  	  
Finally,	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  were	  also	  scholars	  making	  normative	  arguments	  for	  
what	  is	  roughly	  the	  status	  quo,	  arguing	  that	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  
destabilize	  the	  system,	  undermine	  the	  rights	  of	  minorities,	  and	  violate	  the	  rights	  of	  
state.	  
I	  believe	  that	  I	  have	  contributed	  three	  things	  with	  this	  project.	  	  To	  my	  
knowledge	  no	  other	  work	  has	  tackled	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  interdisciplinary	  way	  that	  I	  
have	  tried	  here.	  	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  bring	  together	  perspectives	  from	  international	  law	  
scholarship	  and	  normative	  IR	  theorists.	  	  Second,	  I	  have	  organized	  the	  literature	  in	  
normative	  IR	  theory	  in	  a	  way	  that	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  fair	  and	  free	  of	  unchecked	  bias.	  	  
Finally,	  I	  added	  a	  few	  of	  my	  own	  thoughts	  to	  the	  debate.	  	  In	  the	  normative	  theory	  
chapter,	  I	  added	  possible	  case	  examples	  for	  each	  normative	  perspective	  and	  a	  few	  
critiques	  to	  the	  various	  theories	  that	  I	  did	  not	  encounter	  in	  my	  research,	  but	  that	  I	  
felt	  were	  relevant,	  nevertheless.	  	  And,	  I	  now	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  
that	  third	  contribution.	  
Why	  a	  Right	  to	  Secession	  Now?	  
I	  believe	  that	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  needs	  to	  be	  created.	  	  And,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  
time	  is	  ripe	  for	  a	  renewed	  discussion	  concerning	  what	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  should	  or	  
should	  not	  be	  and	  mean.	  	  	  
While	  large	  blocks	  of	  captive	  nations	  no	  longer	  exist,	  there	  are	  still	  a	  number	  
of	  ongoing	  secession	  movements.	  	  In	  one	  article,	  Harry	  Beran	  calls	  secession	  a	  
“neglected	  philosophical	  problem”	  and	  as	  evidence	  provides	  examples	  of	  ongoing	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secession	  conflicts	  contemporary	  to	  that	  1984	  article.	  	  His	  examples	  are	  
“Quebeckers,	  Croatians,	  Scots	  and	  Welsh,	  Corsicans	  and	  Bretons,	  the	  Basques	  of	  
Spain	  and	  France,	  the	  Somalis	  of	  Kenya	  and	  Ethiopia,	  the	  Kurds	  of	  Iran,	  Iraq	  Turkey,	  
and	  Syria,	  or	  the	  Nagas	  and	  Mizos	  of	  India.”112	  	  Most	  of	  those	  ten	  examples	  are	  still	  in	  
search	  of	  a	  meaningful,	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States	  alone	  a	  Google.com	  
search	  reveals	  that	  there	  are	  six	  notable	  ongoing	  secession	  movements	  –	  seven	  if	  
you	  count	  the	  independence	  movement	  in	  Puerto	  Rico.113	  	  While	  many	  of	  these	  
conflicts	  are	  in	  a	  state	  of	  detente,	  elements	  in	  each	  of	  these	  movements	  remain	  
committed	  to	  secession	  and	  independent	  statehood.	  	  While	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  
is	  no	  current	  crisis	  of	  secession,	  it	  is	  still	  a	  relevant	  issue.	  	  The	  obvious	  question	  now	  
is	  why	  should	  we	  be	  discussing	  this	  now?	  
It	  seems	  that	  this	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  only	  really	  gets	  discussed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  some	  
secession	  emergency.	  	  At	  least	  in	  the	  field	  of	  normative	  IR	  theory,	  it	  seems	  that	  most	  
of	  the	  relevant	  scholars	  developed	  their	  positions	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  secession	  
crises:	  first	  by	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  the	  USSR	  then	  by	  the	  break	  up	  of	  Yugoslavia.	  	  Now,	  
we	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  a	  theory	  without	  the	  influence	  of	  an	  imminent,	  
destructive	  push	  for	  independence.	  	  New	  theories	  developed	  now	  will	  likely	  have	  a	  
stronger	  claim	  to	  being	  unbiased	  and	  unaffected	  by	  current	  crises.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Beran	  1984,	  21.	  
113	  Alaskan	  Independence	  Party	  <	  http://www.akip.org/>,	  Cascadian	  Independence	  
Project	  (Consisting	  of	  Oregon,	  Washington,	  &	  British	  Columbia)	  <	  
http://www.cascadianow.org/>,	  The	  Republic	  of	  Lakotah	  
<http://www.republicoflakotah.com/>,	  The	  League	  of	  the	  South	  
<http://dixienet.org/rights/2012/index.php>,	  Texas	  Nationalist	  Movements	  et	  al.	  <	  
http://texnat.org/intro-­‐to-­‐tnm/about-­‐tnm>,	  and	  The	  Second	  Vermont	  Republic	  <	  
http://vermontrepublic.org/>.	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Concluding	  Thoughts	  
Without	  a	  right	  to	  secession,	  non-­‐state	  groups	  seeking	  independence	  have	  
only	  history	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  achieving	  independence.	  	  History	  shows	  just	  four	  widely	  
available	  paths	  to	  independence.	  	  (1)	  Non-­‐state	  groups	  can	  fight	  for	  it.	  	  (2)	  Non-­‐state	  
groups	  can	  be	  freed	  colonies.	  	  (3)	  Non-­‐state	  groups	  can	  be	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐group	  
empire	  in	  the	  process	  of	  implosion.	  	  (4)	  Or,	  non-­‐state	  groups	  can	  be	  lucky	  enough	  to	  
have	  powerful	  state	  view	  their	  creation	  as	  politically	  expedient.	  	  For	  most	  groups,	  
the	  only	  real	  option	  is	  the	  first	  one.	  Having	  a	  process	  in	  place	  whereby	  non-­‐state	  
groups	  can	  work	  for	  secession	  peacefully	  and	  productively	  has	  a	  chance	  of	  greatly	  
reducing	  violence	  when	  the	  next	  non-­‐state	  group	  begins	  its	  push	  for	  independence.	  
To	  that	  list,	  remedial	  right	  theorists	  would	  add	  a	  fifth	  path:	  non-­‐states	  can	  
achieve	  independence	  by	  suffering	  egregiously	  under	  the	  host	  state.	  	  This	  path	  does	  
not	  strike	  me	  as	  being	  much	  better	  than	  the	  first	  one.	  
	  While	  I	  agree	  that	  groups	  who	  are	  victimized	  by	  their	  host	  state	  should	  have	  
a	  right	  to	  secession,	  I	  find	  remedial	  right	  theories	  lacking	  in	  four	  key	  ways,	  as	  I	  
pointed	  out	  earlier.	  	  First,	  the	  international	  community	  is	  already	  sufficiently	  
incentivized	  to	  avoid	  applying	  labels	  to	  crises,	  tying	  a	  right	  to	  secession	  to	  terms	  like	  
“genocide”	  and	  “ethnic	  cleansing”	  would	  only	  serve	  to	  cause	  states	  to	  use	  the	  terms	  
less,	  which	  could	  deny	  victim	  groups	  the	  other	  aid	  that	  goes	  along	  with	  those	  terms.	  	  
Second,	  the	  fact	  that	  activation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  remedial	  theories	  
requires	  death,	  suffering,	  and	  acts	  of	  violence	  is	  disconcerting	  for	  me.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  
theoretically	  possible	  to	  provoke	  acts	  of	  egregious	  injustice	  against	  yourself.	  	  
Especially	  if	  the	  threshold	  is	  set	  low.	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I	  am	  similarly	  not	  convinced	  of	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  ascriptive	  right	  to	  
secession.	  	  The	  process	  of	  defining	  what	  a	  ‘nation’	  is	  and	  is	  not	  simply	  seems	  too	  
subjective	  to	  me.	  	  Clearly	  the	  French	  and	  German	  are	  separate	  peoples	  who	  should	  
have	  rights	  to	  separate	  nations.	  	  But,	  are	  Texans	  and	  Oklahomans	  distinct	  enough	  to	  
justify	  the	  secession	  of	  one?	  	  Surely	  many	  Texans	  would	  say	  that	  they	  are,	  but	  many	  
Texans	  would	  declare	  ‘American’	  their	  nationality.	  	  What	  differentiates	  
nationalities?	  	  Additionally,	  as	  I	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  I	  see	  the	  possibility	  that	  an	  
ascriptive	  right	  could	  incentivize	  host	  states	  to	  subtly	  and	  quietly	  subvert	  minority	  
cultures	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  de-­‐legitimize	  their	  claims	  to	  secession	  later.	  
I	  feel	  myself	  morally	  drawn	  to	  an	  associative	  primary	  right	  to	  independence:	  
the	  right	  to	  secession	  equivalent	  of	  a	  ‘no-­‐fault	  divorce.’	  	  I	  am	  drawn	  by	  the	  liberal	  
arguments	  expressed	  the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  (referenced	  in	  the	  
opening	  chapter)	  and	  re-­‐developed	  by	  Harry	  Beran	  and	  Christopher	  Wellman.	  	  And,	  
this	  perspective	  should	  not	  be	  unpalatable	  for	  Americans,	  as	  our	  own	  revolution	  
arguably	  falls	  into	  this	  category.	  	  	  
I	  ultimately	  believe	  that	  a	  single	  person	  cannot	  draft	  a	  complete	  right	  to	  
secession.	  	  What	  I	  would	  suggest	  is	  a	  committee	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  International	  
Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty,	  where	  committee	  members	  are	  
selected	  from	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  countries	  and	  backgrounds,	  where	  meetings	  are	  
conducted	  around	  the	  world	  to	  gather	  the	  greatest	  and	  most	  diverse	  points	  of	  view	  
possible.	  	  So,	  while	  I	  recognize	  this	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  sketch	  out	  a	  complete	  treatise	  
on	  the	  right	  to	  secession,	  I	  do	  feel	  that	  an	  outline	  might	  not	  be	  completely	  out	  of	  line.	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I	  begin	  by	  suggesting	  the	  creation	  of	  permanent,	  non-­‐partisan	  international	  
body	  tasked	  with	  overseeing	  the	  process	  of	  secession,	  perhaps	  an	  added	  arm	  of	  an	  
existing	  organization	  like	  the	  United	  Nations	  
I	  base	  my	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  the	  classic	  Lockean	  ideal	  of	  “rule	  by	  the	  
consent	  of	  the	  governed.”	  	  As	  such,	  I	  agree	  with	  Beran	  and	  others	  that	  people	  living	  
within	  the	  bounds	  of	  a	  proposed	  new	  nation	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  
new	  state.	  	  The	  vote	  should	  be	  administered	  by	  a	  commonly	  agreed	  third	  party	  and	  
the	  vote	  required	  for	  secession	  should	  be	  a	  high	  qualified	  majority	  –	  I	  would	  suggest	  
perhaps	  as	  high	  as	  80	  or	  90	  percent	  in	  favor	  for	  the	  measure	  to	  pass.	  
The	  logical	  concern	  –	  it	  is	  raised	  by	  many	  writers	  on	  this	  subject	  –	  is	  that	  an	  
open	  right	  to	  secession	  like	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  secession	  of	  states	  no	  bigger	  than	  a	  
city	  block.	  	  Like	  Beran,	  I	  counter	  that	  while	  some	  zealous	  people	  may	  try	  to	  create	  a	  
nation	  of	  their	  block,	  the	  overwhelming	  ramifications	  and	  logistical	  challenges	  of	  
setting	  up	  a	  new	  nation	  would	  deter	  all	  but	  the	  most	  serious	  and	  prepared	  groups	  
from	  working	  towards	  secession.	  	  The	  zealous	  would	  be	  further	  hampered	  by	  
national	  identity.	  	  While	  an	  associative	  right	  theoretically	  allows	  people	  to	  secede	  
who	  may	  not	  share	  an	  ethno-­‐nationalist	  identity,	  or	  who	  may	  all	  share	  their	  ethno-­‐
nationalist	  identity	  with	  the	  greater	  host	  state,	  it	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  
convince	  a	  group	  of	  people	  to	  abandon	  a	  state	  that	  shares	  their	  national	  identity	  and	  
is	  functioning	  well	  on	  a	  poorly	  designed	  whim.	  	  Texas	  provides	  a	  good	  example.	  	  
Texas	  has	  a	  high	  level	  of	  nationalism,	  a	  fairly	  large	  territory	  and	  population,	  and	  a	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GDP	  in	  excess	  of	  a	  trillion	  dollars.114	  	  However,	  only	  “18	  percent	  of	  Texans	  would	  
vote	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  U.S.	  if	  given	  a	  choice.	  Three-­‐fourths	  of	  Texas	  citizens	  said	  
they	  oppose	  secession.”115	  
In	  addition	  to	  ensuring	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  applicant	  for	  secession,	  the	  
high-­‐threshold	  qualified	  majority	  required	  could	  also	  encourage	  gerrymandering	  of	  
the	  nation-­‐to-­‐be.	  	  When	  trying	  to	  divide	  a	  territory	  into	  several	  groups	  where	  the	  
stakes	  are	  a	  simple	  majority,	  gerrymandering	  can	  have	  serious	  negative	  
consequences.	  	  However,	  in	  this	  situation,	  gerrymandering	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  beneficial.	  	  
Rather	  than	  drawing	  the	  lines	  around	  as	  much	  land	  and	  other	  desirable	  objects	  as	  
possible,	  the	  non-­‐state	  group	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  draw	  the	  lines	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  
to	  include	  people	  who	  want	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  new	  nation	  while	  leaving	  people	  who	  
want	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  host	  nation	  alone.	  
Next,	  like	  many	  others	  who	  have	  written	  on	  this	  topic,	  I	  worry	  about	  
minority	  protection.	  	  It	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  draw	  borders	  without	  minority	  
groups.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  –	  most	  recently	  in	  Kosovo	  and	  Bosnia	  –	  there	  is	  a	  real	  
chance	  the	  victims	  of	  injustice	  in	  the	  old	  state	  can	  become	  the	  victimizers	  in	  the	  new	  
state.	  	  But,	  another	  strength	  I	  see	  in	  primary	  right	  theories	  is	  that	  the	  level	  of	  
animosity	  between	  groups	  has	  a	  legitimate	  chance	  of	  staying	  low	  because	  the	  
situation	  may	  never	  devolved	  into	  violence.	  	  Still,	  feelings	  of	  anger	  and	  vengeance	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are	  likely	  to	  still	  be	  factors,	  even	  in	  amicable	  secession.	  	  As	  such,	  some	  sort	  of	  
conflict	  and	  violence	  mediation	  should	  be	  required	  of	  the	  groups	  and	  individuals	  
involved.	  	  Where	  injustice	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  split,	  a	  la	  “Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  
Committees;”	  where	  injustice	  was	  not	  a	  serious	  factor,	  perhaps	  something	  as	  simple	  
as	  regular	  structured	  talks	  between	  leaders.	  	  The	  new	  nation	  and	  its	  former	  host	  
state	  will	  at	  the	  very	  least	  be	  neighbors,	  but	  will	  likely	  remain	  important	  partners	  
for	  each	  other.	  	  
I	  see	  a	  need	  for	  a	  codified	  right	  to	  secession	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  
International	  law	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  develop	  a	  universal	  right	  to	  secession	  on	  any	  
sort	  of	  lasting	  basis	  or	  criteria.	  	  And,	  while	  scholars	  have	  explored	  a	  number	  of	  
visions	  for	  what	  secession	  might	  look	  like,	  the	  one	  that	  is	  the	  most	  convincing	  for	  me	  
is	  also	  the	  most	  permissive.	  	  For	  this	  issue	  to	  be	  solved	  in	  a	  lasting	  and	  meaningful	  
way,	  we	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  guided	  associative	  primary	  right	  to	  secession.	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